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FOREWORD 
he EU budget and the common agricultural policy (CAP) are two of 
the most complex subjects to master in EU affairs. The mechanisms 
of both require detailed knowledge for anyone who cares to begin to 
understand either of them. 
For 17 years as an MEP, I lived and breathed both subjects and no 
doubt managed to bore my colleagues every time I spoke about them. 
Whilst the EU has 23 official languages, the language of the budget is so 
esoteric that it is the 24th EU language and one that very few understand. 
As for the CAP, over those 17 years, whenever a student asked me 
for a subject title for a dissertation I would suggest, “Who makes the 
decisions for the CAP?”. The process of this decision-making is like the 
novel, The Secret Garden – a place where only a few can enter and 
understand. Put these two subjects together and add the UK rebate, plus 
the fact of net-contributor member states having stricter and tighter 
domestic budgets and not wishing to contribute more to the EU, then it all 
makes for a fascinating scenario. 
Both subjects beg the question of quo vadis EU. The speech of the then 
UK Prime Minister Tony Blair to the European Parliament in June 2005 
asked what the EU aspires to be. He offered up the UK rebate if the 
emphasis of EU spending could be changed to reflect a 21st century Europe. 
And that meant radical changes to the CAP amongst other things. So far, 
there has been no reciprocation to offer up the CAP. 
The budget of a Parliament should reflect its political priorities and 
so should the budget of the EU. The question asked was what those 
priorities are. 
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We now have a financial perspective up to 2013 with a review 
promised in 2008. This report can be and should be a major contributor to 
that review. The work of the Task Force was extremely thorough and CEPS 
needs to be congratulated for this initiative. But most of the praise has to go 
to Jorge Núñez Ferrer for the amount of research, time and effort that he 
has devoted to this work. 
This report is a work of major significance, which recognises reality 
a n d  w h a t  n e e d s  t o  c h a n g e  i f  t h e  E U  i s  t o  m e e t  t h e  c h a l l e n g e s  o f  t h i s  
century. I recommend it without hesitation and hope that it will play no 
small part in the review of 2008. 
Terry Wynn,  
Task Force Chairman 
November 2007 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
he structure and rationale underlying the EU budget is the subject of 
intense debate: the appropriateness of its resources, size and 
objectives are contested by citizens, politicians and academics alike, 
with widely diverging opinions. Given the inability of the member states to 
agree on policy reforms, decision-making over the EU budget has been 
reduced to a mathematical contest, with member states using budget 
headings as tools to achieve specific net balances. The links between policy 
rationale, need and financial requirements to achieve specific goals have 
become highly disrupted.  
In December 2005, the European Council invited the Commission to 
undertake a full review of the EU budget and to report its findings in 2008–
09. This CEPS Task Force report assesses the budget in terms of the policies 
on which EU resources are spent, and the interaction between the quality of 
expenditures and the resources mechanism. The report identifies the 
misallocation of resources as a central cause of the net balance disputes and 
rebate mechanisms that plague the system and undermine its fairness.  
Findings and recommendations for EU expenditure  
The allocation of EU expenditures should be revisited. Any reforms, 
however, should ensure that expenditures incorporate a set of important 
principles. A substantial body of research has analysed the optimal role of 
the EU budget and the characteristics it should have. Moreover, the EU has 
enshrined certain precepts for the use of funds in the EU Treaties. Drawing 
from these sources, this report lists fundamental principles on which 
expenditures should be based: 
•  Value for money – in terms of efficiency and cost effectiveness in 
attaining the objectives 
•  Subsidiarity 
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•  Additionality 
•  Proportionality 
In addition to these principles, expenditures from the EU budget 
should also focus on European public goods, more specifically those that are 
underfunded and deemed to provide European added value. Intervention at 
the EU level should support the EU’s political and economic objectives, and 
do so efficiently. Actions should be in line with the need to foster overall 
growth in the EU and with the Lisbon strategy. When important objectives 
do not allow promoting growth, interventions should at least minimise any 
negative effects, i.e. reduce all opportunity costs to a minimum. 
Using these principles as a framework for evaluating expenditures, 
EU policies often score very badly. They are ineffectual even in achieving 
their own objectives. The following conclusions are drawn for the main EU 
policy areas – the common agricultural policy (CAP) and rural 
development, regional policy, competitiveness, and internal and external 
security.  
•  The CAP market support policies fail to address their objectives in a 
cost-effective way and the distribution of support is distorted and 
unjustifiable. Payment levels primarily relate to yields from decades 
ago and have little relevance to the objectives they are supposed to 
target (either good farming practices or income support). With 
respect to adding value, the policy wastes resources to such an extent 
(with similarly large opportunity costs) that it may be considered 
negative. The same could be achieved with fewer resources – or 
much more with what is available. The added value for the EU of 
having an agricultural policy in the first place is an issue of debate. 
•  The rural development policy is developing into an instrument with 
a potentially important impact on rural economic development and 
environmental protection, but it is still in its infancy. Its role is not yet 
well defined, and it is still mainly designed as an accompanying 
measure for the agricultural policy and thus excessively influenced 
by solely agricultural interests. Rural development means much 
more than agricultural support, particularly given that the economies 
of rural areas rely greatly on non-agricultural factors (such as 
infrastructure and services) and the presence of other sectors.   
•  Regional policy has been generally in line with its goal of promoting 
cohesion. Its performance, however, has been uneven and some of its 
objectives have evolved for political or net balance reasons rather THE UK REBATE AND THE CAP – PHASING THEM BOTH OUT? | v 
 
than economic ones. In any case, performance of the regional 
development funds depends largely on the merits of the strategy and 
programmes of the member states, which have varied considerably. 
The impact of budgetary expenditures is profoundly affected by the 
quality of national policies. The creation of new expenditure lines 
and the expansion of other ones in favour of competitiveness, 
employment, and research and development (R&D) have little 
significance for the EU economy if member states’ fiscal, regulatory 
and labour market policies are suboptimal or even 
counterproductive. 
•  Innovation is recognised as a key factor for the growth and future 
sustainability of the European economy. It is well documented that 
the EU spends less as a share of GDP on R&D than the US or Japan. 
The European Commission has proposed a substantial rise in funds 
for research and investments leading to increased competitiveness. 
But finance from public funding as a share of R&D is already higher 
than it is in the US or Japan, which raises the question of whether the 
problem lies more in a lack of the right incentives for private R&D 
investment.  
•  Given the importance for the EU of ensuring the security of its 
citizens, increasing its presence abroad and helping to foster stability 
in the EU’s neighbourhood, the amounts allocated to these budget 
headings are far from sufficient. 
Recommendations concerning EU expenditures 
•  The CAP needs radical reform. The continuation of such a policy 
requires at the very least that support be brought in line with the 
objectives to be achieved. Payments should not be all embracing, but 
more specific, reflecting the particular circumstances and costs. Farm 
income support should be tied to farm household income, and other 
payments to the costs of achieving the objectives. Farms with a high 
turnover should not be supported for mandatory good farming 
practices. 
•  It is important that rural development policies are improved and 
their scope is broadened. They should support the entire rural 
economy. This recommendation does not exclude support for 
agriculture and food – agri-environmental programmes and food 
safety are important – but the scope of the policies and the eligibility vi | NÚÑEZ FERRER 
 
criteria should be revisited. Policies not aiming at agri-environmental 
actions should focus on areas in need. A territorial approach should 
be developed, in which poorer areas receive the bulk of support. This 
is a concept already applied in regional policy. The policy also has to 
be freed from the CAP and the links to the distribution of direct 
payments must be completely severed.   
•  The eligible activities for expenditures under regional policy should 
be revisited. Conditionalities should be strengthened and regional 
fund allocations should include performance-related criteria that are 
stronger than the present performance reserve, which is based on the 
absorption of funds rather than the quality of execution or the actual 
achievement of results.  
•  The EU and its member states should review the tax and regulatory 
frameworks for R&D, and consider whether these make the 
environment too hostile for stimulating private investment and 
private initiatives. It is also important that the new competitiveness 
heading does not soon become a tool to redirect funds deducted from 
the CAP towards protecting net balances. Competitiveness funds 
should be allocated according to needs and the search for excellence 
and not by net balance considerations. 
•  Funds for external actions should be increased considerably. 
Findings and recommendations for the EU’s system of traditional 
own resources 
Problems in the system for deriving the EU’s traditional own resources can 
be traced back to distortions on the expenditure side of the budget. It is 
there that reforms have to be undertaken first. Further changes in the 
resources system such as an automatic, generalised correction mechanism 
may even cause the situation to deteriorate, first by institutionalising 
rebates as a way to avoid reforms in expenditures, and second by the risk 
that the mechanism itself is likely to be distorted further. If member states 
continue to challenge the quality and cost of the policies, then corrections 
may arise beyond any that an automatic mechanism may introduce  
Recommendations for the own resources system 
•  The most practical solution identified would be to introduce a very 
limited number of taxes (based on exiting taxes in addition to those 
from which traditional own resources are derived) with a marginal THE UK REBATE AND THE CAP – PHASING THEM BOTH OUT? | vii 
 
contribution to ensure that contributions equal member states’ shares 
of gross national income. A ‘real’ VAT resource with a marginal 
contribution would be the simplest solution under such a system. 
Findings and recommendations for decision-making on the budget 
The EU must reconsider the decision-making procedure for the financial 
perspectives. Under the present system, the decisions taken on the financial 
perspectives are very suboptimal, and the role of the European Parliament 
is ambiguous and too weak. The draft Reform Treaty codifies the 
procedures for the financial perspectives, but the European Parliament still 
has a secondary role.  
Recommendations for decision-making 
•  The responsibility of the European Parliament should increase for the 
contents of the financial perspectives and the resources needed to 
fulfil the agreed aims. This shift can be achieved if Parliament 
endorses the European Commission’s proposal for the multi-annual 
financial perspectives before the proposal is presented to the Council. 
Such a move would increase the accountability of the European 
Parliament for the level of resources requested and the policies 
proposed.  
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INTRODUCTION 
he European Council declaration of December 2005 invited the 
Commission to undertake a full review of the EU budget and to 
report its findings in 2008–09. Indeed, the EU budget is the subject of 
intense debate: the appropriateness of its resources, size and objectives are 
contested by citizens, politicians and academics alike, even if the opinions 
of the various stakeholders diverge widely. 
Reports by the European Court of Auditors, academic studies and 
even the Sapir report (Sapir et al., 2003) commissioned in July 2002 by the 
then European Commission President Romano Prodi, also criticise the 
goals, implementation and added value of the EU budget. Consequently, 
the contributory solidarity of member states has practically disappeared. 
Reluctant net contributors agree on a suboptimal policy mix apparently 
dictated mainly by political pressures and the wish not to cause a 
breakdown of EU structures.  
Support for the expenditures of the EU budget is running thin. 
Meaningful policy discussions were virtually non-existent during the 
negotiations on the latest financial perspective. Net balance considerations 
seemed to dominate negotiations to an overwhelming extent. It is normal 
that net balances play a role and these are a recurrent feature in public 
spending disputes in federal states; thus, net balance considerations are 
impossible to avoid in a budget formed by contributions from sovereign 
states. It is widely accepted, however, that the influence of net balance 
considerations has become excessive.  
Reducing net balance disputes will depend on expenditures being 
based on commonly agreed objectives and commonly agreed levels of 
funding. In a heterogeneous structure such as the EU, with very different 
national interests, finding a common denominator is extremely complex.  
The budget of the EU is essentially a unique intergovernmental 
agreement among sovereign states to pool a limited share of their resources 
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to address agreed problems at the European level. What the optimal 
objectives and levels of expenditure are remains a difficult question to 
answer. In theory, the best expenditure objectives are those for which 
spending by a supranational structure is more efficient than national 
expenditures. The theory of fiscal federalism lists the kinds of expenditures 
that would be most advantageously allocated to a common budget. Yet in 
practice, a common budget for a body like the EU cannot be based on the 
efficient, first-best choices of the theory. The EU is given the degree of 
competence that is politically acceptable and feasible, which entails a budget 
that only finances some areas the theory assigns to a supranational body 
and includes expenditures fiscal federalism would not allocate to such a 
body.  
Any analysis of the budget has to take into account the political 
realities of the EU as well as formal theorems in order to be relevant and 
offer practical, even if radical, solutions. That being said, and despite the 
political nature of the EU, the EU budget should abide by some basic 
principles. Some of them can be found in the EU Treaties, while others 
should govern any public expenditure measure, national or supranational.  
This report presents a list of such principles, which provides the 
structure for an evaluation of policies funded by the EU budget and their 
performance in achieving their stated aims, along with a discussion of their 
shortcomings. These guiding principles also serve as a framework for 
considering future reform options. 
The report is divided into four parts:  
•  Part I concentrates on the budget expenditures. It assesses the 
appropriateness of the objectives and expenditures based on 
fundamental principles that should guide the EU budget.  
•  Part II reviews the own resources system. 
•  Part III discusses the decision-making procedures with particular 
attention given to the Interinstitutional Agreement. 
•  Part IV examines the implications of the 2007–13 financial 
perspectives agreement on the distribution of the budget and the net 
balances. 
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PART I.  EXPENDITURES: PRINCIPLES, 
OBJECTIVES AND PERFORMANCE  
he EU budget is a multinational financial instrument created to 
support the political and economic objectives of the EU. Despite the 
political nature of the EU and its objectives, the effectiveness of a 
common budget still depends on a number of precepts of good governance, 
such as the right delegation of responsibilities among different territorial 
levels, the correct allocation of resources to efficiently and cost effectively 
fulfil the objectives, and the proper level of control. Failure to give due 
regard to these precepts reduces the effectiveness of policies, wastes 
resources and ultimately increases the chance of disputes among the 
contributors to the common budget, especially in periods of particular 
pressure on national public resources. 
The optimal division of competence among various levels of 
governance has been analysed in the past using the theory of fiscal 
federalism. Authored by Musgrave (1959), fiscal federalism assesses the 
best level of governance for different policies. The theory has been 
subsequently adapted for the institutional realities of the EU by a number 
of analysts,1 because the EU cannot be considered just another level of 
governance, as is the case with the federal government of the US.  
All the studies come to similar conclusions on what should be the 
guiding principles for EU expenditure priorities. These should be taken 
into account in any reform that aims at better achieving common EU 
objectives. This part of the report looks at how well EU intervention and 
resource allocation reflects these principles, and assesses EU policies 
against the stated goals. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Persson et al. (1996), Tabellini (2003), Gros & Micossi (2005), 
Sapir (2003), Buti & Nava (2003) and Figueira (2006). 
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1.  Fundamental principles for policies financed by the EU 
budget  
The EU budget has very limited resources, with which it is expected to 
support the construction of the European Union project. Even admitting 
that the EU is primarily regulatory in nature, some actions at the EU level 
require substantial funds. Given that the EU budget is limited in size, it is 
of paramount importance that expenditures enable the attainment of 
objectives efficiently and that actions are cost effective. These are simple value-
for-money guidelines, which imply such activities as regular evaluations.  
Apart from these rather obvious (if not necessarily fulfilled) 
requirements the EU Treaties and rules mention other specific principles: 
subsidiarity, additionality and proportionality. 
Subsidiarity. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 enshrines this principle 
as a crucial characteristic of any EU policy or budget item. The EU should 
only act when it is better suited to do so compared with lower levels of 
governance. This approach is in line with fiscal federalism theory in terms 
of competence distribution. The wording of the Treaty excludes from this 
principle those areas in which the EU has exclusive competence, such as the 
common agricultural policy (CAP).  
Additionality.  EU financial intervention should not substitute for 
national funding that would have been disbursed in the absence of EU 
intervention, nor should EU funding reduce aggregate national public 
spending. This rule is required for the cohesion policy, but it should apply 
in general, unless EU resources pool all national financial resources for a 
policy, which is the case for market support measures in agriculture.2  
Proportionality.  According to EU law, the EU may only act to 
exactly the extent that is needed to achieve its objectives and no further.  
Finally, and in addition to these principles, economists have put very 
strong emphasis on the need for expenditures to focus on market failures, 
where a European public good is underprovided if left to lower levels of 
governance. Moreover, and implicit in the previous point, these actions 
should foster European added value. The return on the investment should be 
higher than in the absence of EU intervention. 
                                                 
2 There are the notable exceptions that ‘confirm the rule’ of transitory co-financing 
of direct payments for new member states. THE UK REBATE AND THE CAP – PHASING THEM BOTH OUT? | 5 
 
As for the nature of European added value, economists generally 
argue for an economic return that increases the aggregate welfare in the 
EU. For the purpose of this study, it should be borne in mind that the 
returns for some policies are not necessarily welfare enhancing for the 
whole of the EU, nor are they always verifiable. One such case is the 
cohesion policy. It is difficult to quantify the opportunity costs of the 
cohesion policy in terms of welfare loss or gain at the EU level. 
Nevertheless, actions should clearly enhance welfare in the specific area in 
which they are applied compared with no intervention.  
2.  Objectives of the budget 
As noted above, studies on the EU budget often use the fiscal federalism 
theory to analyse the appropriateness of EU expenditure. This theory, 
however, was formulated for federal states and fits oddly with the realities 
of a multinational structure like the EU. Various authors have adapted the 
theory, but still often apply rather ad hoc interpretations of what the 
budget should do in the EU.  
This report acknowledges the existence of objectives enshrined in the 
EU Treaties and subsequent decisions by the EU, regardless of their fit with 
the theory of fiscal federalism. At the same time, the report examines 
whether these objectives and the mechanisms to achieve them are in line 
with the principles stated in section 1. It further looks at whether the 
mechanisms enable the fulfilment of the EU’s objectives efficiently. 
Principles such as subsidiarity in any case originate from fiscal federalism. 
The declarations in the EU Treaty (Title 1, Art. 2) determine the EU’s 
objectives:3  
The Union shall set itself the following objectives:  
–  to promote economic and social progress and a high level of 
employment and to achieve balanced and sustainable 
development, in particular through the creation of an area 
without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of 
economic and social cohesion and through the establishment of 
economic and monetary union, ultimately including a single 
currency in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty,  
                                                 
3 See the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty or TEC) 
consolidated version as amended by the Treaty of Nice, OJ C 321 E, 29.12.2006. 6 | NÚÑEZ FERRER 
 
–  to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular 
through the implementation of a common foreign and security 
policy including the progressive framing of a common defence 
policy, which might lead to a common defence, in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 17,  
–  to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the 
nationals of its member states through the introduction of a 
citizenship of the Union,  
–  to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, 
security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is 
assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect 
to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the 
prevention and combating of crime,  
–  to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on it 
with a view to considering to what extent the policies and 
forms of cooperation introduced by this Treaty may need to be 
revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the 
mechanisms and the institutions of the Community. 
Following the logic in Figueira (2006), the elements in these broad 
objectives can be summarised under the broad aims below: 
•  Economic growth (“economic progress”); 
•  Sustainable growth (“balanced and sustainable development”, 
“employment” and “social progress”); 
•  Cohesion or convergence (“economic and social cohesion”); 
•  External security (“common foreign and security policy including the 
progressive framing of a common defence policy”); and 
•  Internal security (“the rights and interests of the nationals of its 
member states”, “area of freedom, security and justice”, including 
“free movement of persons”, “external border controls”, “asylum 
and immigration” policies and the “prevention and combating of 
crime”). 
In addition to these broad aims, other more specific objectives are 
spelled out in the EU Treaties and subsequent decisions. One of the most 
notable lists of objectives is for the CAP (Art. 33 of the Treaty), which can 
be interpreted as part of the social cohesion objective with redistributive 
effects across sectors (from industry and services to agriculture) and 
individuals (from consumers and taxpayers to farmers).  THE UK REBATE AND THE CAP – PHASING THEM BOTH OUT? | 7 
 
The present EU budget is a result of the past interpretation of the 
way to achieve the stated objectives and the ‘imaginative’ use of the budget 
as a tool to reach compromises on the process of integration among 
member states. Many items have emerged as a bargaining tool to achieve 
agreements, such as the cohesion funds to compensate for the alleged 
negative effects of the single currency, or even the CAP as a compensation 
for France by Germany for the asymmetric effects of market integration.  
The budget structure has concentrated mostly on redistributive 
policies based on (sometimes-questionable) equity criteria. The EU and its 
position in the world have changed substantially in the meantime. 
Concerns about the competitiveness of the EU and environmental 
protection have climbed to the top of the EU’s agenda. Until recently, the 
EU has not regarded growth-oriented policies, for example, as a key aspect 
of the budget, except in the area of convergence. Similarly, environmental 
sustainability was not seen with the urgency of today. Yet, the shift in the 
priorities of the EU has not been matched by changes in the composition of 
the budget (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. EU budget composition, financial perspectives for 2007–13 
 
Source: Calculations based on the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial 
management, OJ 2006/C 139/01, Brussels, 14 June 2006. 
Financial Perspectives 2007-2013
Common agricultural policy 
33.94%
Competitiveness 
for growth and 
employment, 
8.58%
Cohesion, growth 
and employment 
35.67% 
Citizenship, 
freedom, security 
and justice, 1.25%
Rural 
development, 
9.06% 
EU as a global 
player, 5.73%
Administration, 
5.77%8 | NÚÑEZ FERRER 
 
The fact that the CAP and cohesion policy are still the dominating features 
of the budget could be explained by the limited size of the budget. These 
two policies had evolved during a period of European integration, when 
budgetary expansion had been possible. After the limit in the member 
states’ willingness to pool resources had been reached, there has since been 
little flexibility for additional resources for other policies. There are clear 
indications that the present budget concentrates the resources on a very 
narrow portion of the EU’s objectives. Table 1 presents a list of the present 
policies and the financial shares of the main components of the 2007 
budget.  
Table 1. Expenditure headings and instruments of the EU budget and funding 
shares, 2007 
EU policy  Policy headings  Share of 
budget (%) 
•  Education and training  0.71  
•  Research  4.35  
•  Competitiveness and innovation   0.32  
•  Energy and transport networks  0.79  
Competitiveness 
7.43% 
•  Social policy agenda  0.16  
•  Convergence   27.91  
•  Regional competitiveness and 
employment 
7.11  
Cohesion  
35.3% 
•  Territorial cooperation  0.87  
•  Agricultural expenditure and direct 
aids 
33.75  
•  Rural development  9.80  
Preservation of 
natural 
resources 
44.51% 
•  Environment  0.16  
Freedom 
security and 
justice 
•  Security policy, migration policy 
•  Health and consumer protection 
•  Rapid response 
0.47 
Citizenship  •  Culture 
•  Media 
•  Public health and consumer protection 
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Table 1, cont. 
Source: European Commission, 2007 budget figures. 
 
There is apparently a mismatch between the EU’s objectives and the 
distribution of finances. Furthermore, not all the objectives of the EU need 
financial intervention, and if required, not necessarily from the EU budget. 
Thus, based on the principles stated in section 1, it is necessary to 
investigate the following points: 
•  Are the interventions financed by the EU efficient in achieving the 
objectives stated in its policies? 
•  Should the EU budget intervene as a financial tool where it does? 
•  Are the resources appropriate? 
3.  Quality of EU budget interventions 
The initial interventions of the EU budget were linked pro forma to certain 
objectives and only vaguely connected with a theoretically optimum 
distribution of responsibilities. The EU budget was essentially an 
agreement to support certain areas to make integration politically 
acceptable. The budget redistribution mechanism was therefore of a 
political rather than economic nature. 
In fact, the allocation of resources is largely based on a fixed 
geographical distribution with little reactivity to changing needs. It does 
not incorporate any stabilisation mechanism related to economic changes, 
and any revision must be based on a rigid, multi-annual multilateral 
agreement. As the EU increasingly faces global challenges for which a 
pooling of a limited amount of resources for flexible interventions is 
necessary, the mismatch between needs and the budget structure is 
widening. 
•  Pre-accession instrument  1.03  
•  Neighbourhood policy  1.11  
•  Development cooperation  1.74  
•  Humanitarian aid  0.55  
•  Democracy and human rights  0.08  
•  Common foreign and security policy  0.16  
EU as a global 
partner 
5.38% 
•  Stability instrument  0.08  10 | NÚÑEZ FERRER 
 
3.1  Overall budget objectives and resource distribution 
Taking the list of objectives from the EU Treaty, we should expect the 
distribution of funds to correspond to the priorities presented. The 
objectives aim at economic growth, sustainable growth, cohesion or 
convergence, and external and internal security. 
Economic growth. Most interventions fostering economic growth are 
not linked to the budget and while the need to encourage research and 
development (R&D), education, transport and energy networks in the EU 
requires some financing, the level of EU intervention is questionable. As 
the Kok report (European Commission, 2004a) clearly states, economic 
growth is first and most importantly in the hands of the member states and 
in the structural reform of their economies. For the EU, the task mostly 
pertains to the completion of the internal market. It is only in the latest 
financial perspective that promoting growth at the EU level has a more 
substantial budget, although again, the role of the EU budget in this area 
can only be limited and is still open to debate. 
Sustainable growth. Economic progress has to be achieved with due 
regard to the need for sustaining or strengthening social cohesion and 
environmental protection. According to the theory of fiscal federalism, 
while social cohesion is better served at the national level, there is a strong 
argument for EU intervention on environmental protection. Social cohesion 
is nevertheless addressed in the structural funds through the European 
social funds. For the environment, measures are scattered across different 
funds, with infrastructural and other actions being financed under several 
headings. There is, however, little coordinated environmental action nor is 
there a clear environmental budget line. The heading of preservation of 
natural resources could have been expected to have a major environmental 
protection component, but that is not the case. Of the budget for natural 
resources in 2007, 77% is allocated to direct payments in agriculture 
compared with 22% to rural development and only 0.4% to the 
environment. Some environmental aspects are present in the agriculture 
and rural development policies, but these are predominately related to 
agriculture and not to the major challenges of energy efficiency for 
example. There is a need to assess whether the EU budget should not be 
more active in the area of the environment.  
Cohesion or convergence. Fostering cohesion and convergence are 
the key objectives of the EU budget with most of the budget dedicated to 
achieving them. Indeed, agricultural policy is often referred to as part of THE UK REBATE AND THE CAP – PHASING THEM BOTH OUT? | 11 
 
cohesion policy, to reduce income disparities among social groups. The 
budget distribution should be very influenced by these two policies, with 
financial flows directed towards problem areas in the agricultural sector 
and towards poorer regions or countries. Productivity levels in the 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r  t e n d  t o  b e  l o w e r  i n  p o o r e r  c o u n t r i e s ,  a n d  r u r a l  
development problems tend to be worse in poorer areas, especially in the 
new member states. The budgetary distribution seems nonetheless rather 
unrelated to GDP per capita, owing to the regressive distribution of the 
CAP. In 2003, for the EU-15 the correlation between the two was nearly 0 
(Figure 2). With enlargement, the 2013 budget is expected to see an increase 
in the correlation between receipts and GDP per capita, but it is still 
unexpectedly low. 
Figure 2. Budget allocation per capita, 2003 and 2013 
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Internal and external security. Both of these items are rather minor 
in the budget, and the EU has failed to live up to the challenges ahead. A 
pooling of resources and joint action can produce very important 
improvements in these areas, yet both policies are rather weakly funded. 
Efforts towards the objective of creating a common defence policy have 
failed, while the member states have been reticent to increase the role of the 
EU in other areas despite the strong rationale for doing so. 
3.2  Interplay between net balances and policy quality 
Among all the objectives listed in the Treaty, the present focus of the EU 
budget is on social and economic convergence through the CAP and the 
cohesion policy. The EU has marginal l y  u s e d  t h e  b u d g e t  a s  a  t o o l  f o r  
overall economic growth and the application of its finances to internal 
affairs and external action has been rather limited.  
The distribution of EU funds, however, is out of line with cohesion 
objectives, which may well be a central cause of the disputes over the 
budget. The rationale for the expenditures is weak. Furthermore, the 
member states seem to use the budget to ensure that contributions are 
limited and receipts are maximised, adapting measures and introducing 
others to reach net contributory equalisation. The redistributive nature of 
the policy with names or regions attached to funds has induced the 
member states to decide the distribution of the funds based on ‘pork barrel’ 
politics, undermining the quality of interventions.  
Baldwin (2005a) describes how receipts from the EU are so high for 
all the member countries, that the budget is essentially a national 
redistribution mechanism. The net contributions have been less than the 
receipts even for the wealthiest EU member states, such that in 2003 they 
received in excess of 50% of their gross contribution back from the EU 
budget, with the notable exception of the Netherlands, for which the 
amount was similar (i.e. the Netherlands received approximately 50% back) 
(Figure 3). 
According to game theorists Kauppi & Widgren (2006), the budget 
distribution can be fully explained by the power of the member states in the 
EU. Regardless of the policies introduced the net calculation of receipts and 
expenditures for each member state remains stable. Under these 
circumstances, net balances completely govern the budget, which is very 
close to what has been observed.  THE UK REBATE AND THE CAP – PHASING THEM BOTH OUT? | 13 
 
Figure 3. Receipts versus net contributions (operational expenditures only) 
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Note: The net balances are represented in absolute terms. 
Source: Data derived from the European Commission. 
 
Consequently, if one takes the relationship between net balances and 
voting power as a rule, the budget will have extreme difficulty in ensuring 
that the policy mix is optimal while achieving the ‘exogenously’ pre-
determined net balances. A failure to obtain the ‘correct’ net balance using 
expenditure policies would then trigger the need for changes in the 
resources. This situation has clearly been the case.  
On the one hand, the influence of member states’ voting power in 
determining their contributions and receipts has most likely affected the 
quality of policies negatively. On the other hand, the quality of the policies 
also affects the willingness of member states to finance them. In a mutually 
reinforcing, vicious circle, while net balances constrain the ability to reform 
budget policies, the ensuing less-favourable policy compromise induces net 
contributors to concentrate even more on limiting their net financial 
contributions.  
One can conclude that the policy mix of the EU budget is suboptimal 
and encourages a net balance approach to EU expenditure allocation. The 
question is what areas of EU expenditure give rise to this lack of policy 
quality, which is addressed in the analysis below for the different budget 
headings. 
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4.  Performance of the policies financed 
4.1  Agricultural policy and rural development 
The CAP and the rural development policy constitute 98% of the budget 
heading for the preservation of natural resources. Indeed, the name of this 
EU expenditure heading is highly misleading, as 76% of the funding is 
c o m p o s e d  o f  d i r e c t  a i d s  t o  f a r m e r s ,  2 2 %  m a i n l y  t o  r u r a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  
(farm-oriented investments and agri-environmental measures) and a 
pittance to environmental programmes. Given the enormous priority of the 
environment for the future, it is rather unfortunate to see it having such 
little relevance. Because of the cross-border nature of pollution, 
environmental actions quintessentially need to be solved at the 
multinational level. Even admitting that convergence policies and R&D 
have some environmental aspects and that much of the EU’s action is 
regulatory, spending on the environment is surprisingly low. Given the 
challenges posed by climate change and the need for adaptive and 
mitigating practices, there are reasons for substantial budgetary allocation 
in this area. This section evaluates the CAP and rural development policies 
separately. 
4.1.1.  Common agricultural policy 
The CAP faces the greatest criticism of all the budget items. The CAP is one 
of the largest items in the budget, absorbing 36% of EU funds in 2006 and 
34% in 2007 (excluding rural development funds). The policy is widely 
accused of being very inefficient in attaining its own objectives and 
distortive. Many analysts question the need for the policy in the first place. 
The CAP is also often portrayed as the origin of the net balance disputes.  
Moreover, there is hardly any independent evaluation of the CAP 
that does not reveal large inefficiencies. Table 2 presents a summarised 
picture of the CAP’s performance against its objectives as formulated in 
Art. 33 of the EU Treaty.  
The CAP clearly fails to achieve its objectives efficiently and cost 
effectively. It is not surprising that there are many doubts about the need 
for an agricultural policy in the EU. In terms of the principles for 
intervention, Table 3 presents a further evaluation of the policy. It is 
difficult to argue that the CAP should be run and financed by the EU.  
 THE UK REBATE AND THE CAP – PHASING THEM BOTH OUT? | 15 
 
Table 2. Performance of the CAP in achieving its objectives 
Objectives  Quality of intervention, achievement of objective 
To increase agricultural 
productivity by 
promoting technical 
progress and by ensuring 
the rational development 
of agricultural 
production and the 
optimum utilisation of 
the factors of production, 
in particular labour 
Highly inefficient. The CAP has been very successful 
in increasing production, rather than productivity. The 
costs of production have risen, fuelled by subsidies 
and price support, which have driven capital and 
other input costs higher. There is an exceedingly poor 
link between the objectives and the price-support and 
direct-payment systems. 
Ensure a fair standard of 
living for farmers 
 
 
Highly inefficient. Funding has generally been 
targeted at market support policies (including direct 
payments), which are highly distortive and inefficient. 
Most of the support has fallen on large commercial 
farms. No means testing or real cost studies have been 
used to assess the level of support needed. Those most 
in need of support and who are claimed as the main 
target groups (the small family farms primarily 
dependent on agriculture), especially in depressed 
areas, benefit little.  
To stabilise markets  Working but with large externalities. Assessing 
performance depends on interpretation of the term 
‘stabilise’. Prices for farmers in Europe have stabilised, 
but at the cost of distorting the prices of other markets 
and destabilising world markets. 
To assure the availability 
of supplies 
Excessive/wasteful.  The availability of supplies was 
soon assured and then exceeded, creating the 
infamous surpluses that needed dumping or 
destroying. The situation has improved strongly in the 
last decade, but there is still a degree of distortion and 
of dumping on the world market. 
To ensure that supplies 
reach consumers at 
reasonable prices 
Failed. Given the inefficiency of the policy in attaining 
its objectives, high prices for consumers are 
unreasonable.  
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Table 3. Score on the principles of intervention for the CAP  
Compulsory 
Subsidiarity  Failed. Proponents of the policy consider that the policy 
fulfils this criterion because the CAP is necessary for the 
single market of agricultural products. There is, 
however, no reason for the EU to be using EU funds to 
support agriculture. A single market can be guaranteed 
through regulations. There are state-aid rules for other 
sectors that could be applied. 
Proportionality  Failed. As the objectives of the policy have been poorly 
attained and drawn heavy criticism about the fairness of 
funding allocations, it fails to fulfil this criterion. In any 
case, most funds are distributed without any actual cost 
assessment related to accomplishing the objectives. The 
levels of payments are directly or indirectly linked to 
decades-old yields per hectare and the number of some 
farm animals. 
Additionality  Does not apply. Governments have pooled their 
resources. National financial allocations are not possible.  
Value for money  Failed. The policy is highly inefficient and costly.  
Highly recommended 
European public good  Failed.  According to  fiscal federalism theory, there is 
hardly any reason to support agriculture at the EU level. 
While agricultural land and the preservation of rural 
areas and their environment can be viewed as a public 
good, intervention through the price-support and direct-
payment CAP policies is far from cost effective. 
European added value  Failed.  The policy does not add value to Europe in 
economic terms. At the political level, its contribution 
today can even be regarded as negative owing to the 
negative implications of the policy for the EU budget. 
 
The CAP does indeed play a controversial role in the distribution of 
funds through the EU budget. Because of the way it is designed, it benefits 
countries with the highest yields from specific products, and within these  
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countries the largest and often wealthiest producers, as it overwhelmingly 
consists of direct payments that are still allocated according to historical 
yields per hectare.4  
Given that cohesion policy is related to GDP per capita and is 
progressive in nature, the CAP must primarily be benefiting wealthier 
member states. This result seems to be confirmed by analysis when CAP 
expenditure distribution is excluded (Figure 4). The regression analysis 
shows a much stronger negative link between GDP per capita and 
budgetary receipts. This relationship is not perfect, as support is limited by 
a gross national income (GNI) ceiling5 and distribution is at the regional 
and not the national level.  
Figure 4. Receipts per capita and GDP without the CAP, 2003 
 
Source: Own calculations, Eurostat database. 
 
                                                 
4 The payments per farm are not necessarily based on the historical farm yields, as 
often regional or national averages are used. Nevertheless, farms in historically 
high yielding countries and/or regions still receive higher payments and larger 
farms more than smaller ones. Direct payments indirectly and unofficially continue 
to compensate for the intervention price reductions in the years 1992 and 2000.  
5 Structural and cohesion funds cannot exceed 4% of the GNI of the recipient 
country, with the exact ceiling determined by the GDP per capita income as a 
percentage of the EU average.  18 | NÚÑEZ FERRER 
 
The highest yields are generally found in the most developed 
countries. Also, cattle are highly supported and concentrated in specific 
member states. Consequently, the largest payments tend to end up in the 
wealthiest countries. Belgium, Denmark, France and Ireland are major 
beneficiaries, to the extent that a prosperous country such as Denmark has 
been a net beneficiary of the budget since the year 2000 and Ireland is 
expected to remain so for the foreseeable future.  
The regressivity of the policy becomes apparent when the CAP direct 
payments are plotted in relation to the GDP per capita of member states 
(Figure 5). The regression analysis shows, however, that the correlation 
between GDP per capita and CAP receipts is extremely low – nearly 
random – and Ireland introduces a strong element of bias.  
Figure 5. CAP receipts per capita and GDP per capita, 2003 
 
Source: Own calculations, Eurostat database. 
 
The regressivity at the national level described earlier is also strongly 
evident at the farm level – a similar and not surprising relationship can be 
found between CAP receipts per farmer6 and the net value added per farm 
                                                 
6 In the analysis, agricultural working unit (AWU) – a full-time equivalent worker 
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in Table 4 and Figure 6. It is clear that this regressivity has been 
exacerbated by enlargement and it will grow even stronger after the full 
introduction of the CAP payments in the new member states, as production 
per hectare was low in the years prior to enlargement. 
Table 4. Regressivity of CAP payments (EU-15), 2003 
Farm size 
(measured 
by farm 
value added, 
in €) 
Number of 
beneficiaries 
(farms) 
Average 
payment 
per 
recipient 
(in €) 
Cumulative 
payments 
(largest 
farms to 
smallest,  
in %) 
Cumulative 
number of 
recipients 
(largest 
farms to 
smallest,  
in %) 
Cumulative 
payments 
(smallest 
farms to 
largest 
in %) 
Cumulative 
number of 
recipients 
(smallest 
farms to 
largest, 
in %) 
> 500,000  10    413,258  0.1   0.002   100.0   100.0  
> 300,000 and 
< 500,000  20    380,465  0.2   0.01   99.9   100.0  
> 200,000 and  
< 300,000  100    238,819  0.5   0.03   99.8   100.0  
> 100,000 and  
< 200,000  2,400    123,679  5.1   0.5   99.5   99.9  
> 50,000 and  
< 100,000  20,550    65,721  25.9   5.0   94.9   99.4  
> 20,000 and  
< 50,000  84,320    30,928  66.0   23.3   74.1   95.0  
> 10,000 and  
< 20,000  90,430    14,400  86.1   43.0   34.0   76.7  
> 5,000 and  
< 10,000  80,290    7,202  94.9   60.4   13.9   57.0  
> 2,000 and  
< 5,000  71,300    3,382  98.7   75.9   5.1   39.6  
> 1,250 and  
< 2,000  27,380    1,602  99.3   81.8   1.3   24.1  
> 0 and  
< 1,250  83,590    519  100.0   100.0   0.7   18.2  
Total  460,520      14,113.51 – – – – 
Sources: Baldwin (2005b), based on data from “Agriculture in the EU – Statistics and economic 
information”, European Commission, 2004, Table 3.6.1.10. 20 | NÚÑEZ FERRER 
 
Figure 6. CAP receipts versus net added value per AWU, 2003 (EU-15 country 
averages) 
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 It is important to note that these figures do not account for the fact 
that in a number of EU countries, farm activities are not the sole or even the 
main occupation of the farmers and members of the household, thus a low 
income from agricultural activities is not sufficient to justify income 
support. The OECD (2003a and 2006) has presented an initial picture of 
farm household income; in various EU member states the income was 
found to be above the national average.7 A large share of EU farms have 
more than one income source, yet the income support of the policy has 
always been in relation to income from farming alone. That is not the way 
financial social assistance is usually offered to citizens, for which means 
testing usually includes total household income when assessing the need 
for support. 
                                                 
7 See Appendix 1 for an analysis of farm household income. 
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The large share non-agricultural income among agricultural 
households reported by the OECD should also be taken as a clear signal 
that sustaining agriculture in rural areas is equally (if not more) dependent 
on measures aiming at developing alternative sectors in such areas. In other 
words, the health of the farm and non-farm economies in rural areas is 
inextricably linked (see OECD, 2003b and 2006). 
In the rural areas of new member states with high poverty levels, 
non-agricultural households often suffer from greater degrees of poverty 
than do farming households. According to Eurostat, in 2004 the CAP 
increased the incomes of farm households in the new member states by 
50%. This effect was observed despite the merely partial introduction of 
direct payments. Even with all the reforms, price support still accounted for 
roughly half the value of the total (Wichern, 2004) prior to the latest reform. 
Defenders of the CAP often dismiss redistribution concerns by 
claiming that the allocation of funds depends on needs and objectives and 
therefore it is not related to GDP per capita or farm sizes and wealth. This 
argument would be acceptable if the CAP performed well against its ‘own’ 
objectives. In theory, the CAP should follow the objectives of the EU Treaty 
as specifically devised for the sector (Art. 33), and it is questionable 
whether direct payments that are still linked to yields in the 1980s are the 
right tool to achieve them.8 Even accepting the special place of agriculture 
in the EU, the CAP is highly inefficient in reaching the objectives set.  
The latest CAP reform, undertaken as part of the mid-term review 
(MTR), was indeed a very radical reform, making a large step forward to 
decouple the agricultural support from production – a process that had 
started with the MacSharry reforms in 1992. These reforms are 
undoubtedly important and merit due recognition. Necessary reforms do 
not mean sufficient reforms, however. The MTR reinforced the EU’s 
position at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations and reduced 
market distortions in the EU, but has left largely intact the distribution 
pattern of support at the national, regional and farm levels.  
The assessments of the performance of the CAP in Tables 2 and 3 
(excluding the rural development heading) illustrate again that the policy 
                                                 
8 E v e n  i f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p a y m e n t s  within countries has to a certain extent 
shifted away from historical yields, the allocation of the level of support to each 
country is still largely based on these parameters, which persists owing to the net 
balance implications of any change. 22 | NÚÑEZ FERRER 
 
appears to have largely failed to achieve many of its objectives effectively, 
if at all. Particularly damaging for the CAP has been the significant 
negative externalities it has created for other markets, especially for the 
world market of agricultural products. There is no environmental objective 
for the CAP in the EU Treaty, but the detrimental implications of the policy 
on the environment have been important. Protection of the environment is 
becoming an integral part of the CAP, but it is still a regulatory by-product 
often regarded as just a tool for making the direct payments presentable, 
which is done through the cross-compliance obligations for direct 
payments (the Statutory Management Requirements and for keeping land 
in Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition).  
The results indicate that the present CAP, which concentrates on 
support through direct payments, should generally be phased out and 
redesigned. Some limited aspects could be retained such as financial 
assistance to poor farmers (based on the means testing of household 
incomes). Environmental support could be linked to regulatory systems 
and rural development programmes. Direct financial support should be 
granted in a manner that better reflects the estimated costs of 
accomplishing the policy’s objectives. Support should not be linked to 
unrelated historical yields. Farms with large turnovers should not be 
granted any direct support. 
4.1.2. Rural development policy 
As a response to the failings of the CAP, a shift has been taking place that 
has seen the growing importance of the rural development policy, which 
can be considered in line with the policies on convergence and sustainable 
growth. The rural development policy has a large number of measures that 
can be classified under three objectives:  
a)  restructuring the farm sector and improving its competitiveness,  
b)  improving the environment and  
c)  assisting the economic development of rural areas. 
The first objective absorbs the largest portion of the funds. The 
second and third objectives are dominated by farms and farming activities, 
which indicate that the rural development policy is essentially a farm 
policy, still viewed by many as an integral part of the CAP rather than the 
start of a new approach to addressing the overall challenges of rural areas, 
including but not exclusively the agricultural sector. THE UK REBATE AND THE CAP – PHASING THEM BOTH OUT? | 23 
 
The dominance of farm-linked assistance is against the 
recommendations of most academic research and work by the OECD (1996, 
2001, 2003b and 2006; Saraceno, 2003). Most studies hold that rural 
development is better achieved by holistic actions targeting all activities in 
the rural economy. Even in the most rural of the EU’s regions, employment 
in agriculture does not match that in services and industry. The decline in 
rural areas is generally attributed by the above-noted studies to declines in 
rural infrastructure quality and services, not in farming. 
Table 5 shows the distribution of rural development funds by 
objective in 2003. Very few funds can be deemed to target territorial 
development. Some improvements will occur with the new regulations for 
rural development, but these still only require that a minimum of 10% of 
the funds are directed towards holistic actions for rural development that 
are not farm-oriented. This is an important change, but rather modest. 
Table 5. Distribution of EU funds by function (EU-15), 2003 
Function EU  funds 
(€ million) 
% Share  Total public 
expenditure 
(€ million) 
% Share 
Sectoral agriculture  3,830  89.22  8,523  88.01 
Territoral, semi-
sectoral and forestry 
749  16.35  1,162  11.98 
of which: 
territorial and 
forestry 
569  12.42  119  11.73 
of which: 
territorial 
alone 
314  6.86  783  7.71 
Total 4,578  100  10,746  100 
Source: European Commission (2006); a further breakdown is given in Appendix 2. 
 
The shortcomings can be partially ascribed to the pressure to use the 
rural development policy as a method for shifting direct payments into 
WTO-compliant and taxpayer-acceptable support for farms, in an attempt 
to keep the distribution of support among beneficiaries close to that for 
direct payments. To a certain extent, this was the original motive for 
creating and reinforcing pillar II of the CAP in the MacSharry and the 
Agenda 2000 reforms. This narrow perspective of rural development 
therefore assumes that a reduction in direct payments should be offset by 24 | NÚÑEZ FERRER 
 
an equivalent increase in rural development support. Some rural 
development support has in fact been accused of financing agricultural 
practices that were being followed anyway.  
The view of rural development as a tool for the general economic 
revival of rural areas is gaining ground, but the distribution of funds 
remains dominated by the CAP. The present restrictions imposed on the 
distribution of rural development support serve as proof – requiring that 
the share of rural development funds modulated from direct payments 
remains largely in the region from which they originate (80%). As a 
consequence, modulated funds will continue to fall on those areas with the 
most productive farms, which are mainly in the richest regions. This 
outcome is likely to cause rising tensions in future budget negotiations, as 
modulated funds from direct payments to much wealthier regions of the 
EU can be several times higher than in the poorest rural areas. 
Further evidence of the misallocation of resources can be found in the 
June 2003 report from the European Court of Auditors,9 which severely 
criticised the distribution of funds for less favoured areas (LFAs). It faulted 
the lack of a justified methodology for selecting the beneficiary areas. 
Member states apparently refused to offer information about the 
methodology used, which increases the suspicion that the designation of 
areas is not based on relevant socio-economic indicators. The disparity of 
classifications may also lead to differential treatment of beneficiaries in 
different member states.  
Despite the embedded socio-economic objectives of supporting 
LFAs, the consistency of the support with economic cohesion objectives is 
poor. ESPON (2006) indicates that LFA payments are not more intensive in 
areas with a lower GDP level or higher unemployment. The somewhat 
political nature of the way in which LFA areas are defined and the flat-rate 
character of payments may have created an element of over-compensation 
in areas where disadvantages compared with non-LFAs are minimal, and 
one of under-compensation in the most severely disadvantaged regions. 
Yet, contrary to the regulation proposed by the European 
Commission, the eligibility criteria for LFAs were not touched. This is 
unfortunate, but the Council agreed to revisit this policy in 2008 with a 
view to reforming it in 2010.  
                                                 
9 See Special Report No. 4/2003 concerning rural development: Support for less-favoured 
areas, European Court of Auditors (2003). THE UK REBATE AND THE CAP – PHASING THEM BOTH OUT? | 25 
 
Finally, apart from the distributional and performance issues (see 
also Table 6), there is a patent limitation to the future size of the rural 
development policy. It is difficult to conceive the creation of a rural 
development budget comparable in size to the CAP or the cohesion funds. 
Furthermore, the co-financing needs for rural development are a serious 
problem.  
Table 6. Performance of rural development funds in achieving their objectives 
Objectives  Quality of intervention, achievement of objective 
Improving the 
competitiveness of the 
agricultural and 
forestry sectors 
Mixed/inconclusive. Evaluations are inconclusive on the 
global impacts of the actions.  
Improving the 
environment and the 
countryside 
Mixed/weak. I t  i s  b i a s e d  t o w a r d s  a g r i - e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
measures that often involve ‘landscaping’ rather than 
protecting the environment. A number of actions finance 
activities that would be undertaken anyway. Support for 
LFAs has been severely criticised by its aleatory 
distribution and the very feeble rationale underlying is 
implementation. 
Improving the quality 
of life in rural areas 
and encouraging 
diversification 
Weak.  It is still centred on farming, while a successful 
rural development policy should target all sectors. Yet, 
the inclusion of the Leader approach in the rural 
development programme and some broadening of the 
scope for actions in non-farming sectors are important. 
 
In addition, the demarcation between rural development and 
structural funds will grow more troublesome, and there are already 
difficulties in the member states with respect to absorbing the funds. It is 
clear that the redistribution of support among countries, regions, rural 
areas and farmers is a crucial issue to address in future budget discussions. 
On the principles for intervention at the EU level, rural development 
is an improvement on the CAP but still fails to fulfil the necessary criteria 
for EU intervention, as Table 7 shows. It needs additional reforms to 
become a well-targeted policy. 
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Table 7. Score on the principles of intervention for the rural development policy 
Compulsory 
Subsidiarity  Pass. But the policy could improve in the way it targets 
those interventions that are better performed at the EU 
level. It is a distributive policy among regions.  
Proportionality  Failed. The policy is not well devised to attain its 
targets to promote the economy in rural areas. It is still 
highly skewed towards agriculture in its social and 
economic objectives. It is affected by political 
impositions unrelated to the objectives, in particular for 
the allocation of funds among regions. 
Additionality  Partially applies. The rule of additionality applies in 
principle, although it is difficult to control in practice. 
For some actions, such as agri-environmental support, 
the policy sometimes finances pre-existing activities and 
works as an income supplement.  
Value for money  Failed. Owing to inefficiencies in allocating the rural 
development funds and the farm bias in the objectives, 
it does not fulfil this criterion. There are hardly any 
income criteria for support. Eligibility is based on the 
‘rurality’ of areas, with rurality vaguely defined.  
Highly recommended 
European public good  Partially. Strictly environmental actions and those 
measures aimed at income diversification may be 
deemed a European public good. Questions remain 
about the correct level of competence in some areas.  
European added value  Partially. Some aspects of the policy, especially in the 
environmental, food safety and development fields may 
be regarded as value enhancing. But the policy needs to 
be better designed. 
 
The rural development policy could play an important role in the 
spatial planning of the EU. It should become a rural dimension of what the 
structural funds do on a larger scale at the regional level. Eligibility criteria 
should be more clearly defined, with a ‘territorial approach’ for many of 
the funds (examples are given in Saraceno, 2003 and Gonzalez Regidor, 
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needed when both funds target the same area, but they should be able to 
co-exist, as the scales of operations are generally different. In fact, a holistic 
rural development policy is rather a convergence policy, but rearranging 
budget headings would cause havoc in the fine-tuning process for phasing 
out part of the CAP to reinforce rural development.  
4.2  Cohesion or convergence policy 
The main concern of the EU expenditure policies has until recently been 
‘redistribution’ in the name of cohesion, now re-branded as ‘convergence’. 
Even the philosophical background of the CAP is originally based on the 
need to counterbalance the income disparities between the farming 
community and the industrial and services sectors. The cohesion policy is 
composed of structural funds (European regional development funds or 
ERDF and social funds or ESF) aimed at regions with a low GDP per capita 
(75% of the EU average) and cohesion funds for countries with a GDP 
under 90% of the EU average. It was thus designed to assist such regions 
and countries lagging behind economically to catch up and to avoid 
deepening centre–periphery income disparities. It was also thought that the 
single market and later monetary union would primarily benefit the 
wealthier member states.  
As a redistribution mechanism between wealthier member states and 
poorer countries and regions, this policy is a natural candidate for a 
common supranational budget. Nevertheless, the performance of the funds, 
the rationale of a number of measures and the eligibility criteria have been 
issues of intense debate.  
4.2.1. Outcomes of the policy 
The results of the EU’s efforts in this area have been mixed; some cohesion 
countries and regions have shown strong tendencies of catching up, while 
others have lagged behind. In both cases, it is difficult to pinpoint the 
importance of the structural funds. Studies tend to agree that the EU funds 
have mobilised investment in excess of a base scenario without EU support, 
but the actual influence on the growth rates is controversial (Bradley et al., 
2004; de la Fuente, 2002). 
The cohesion funds were expected to even out regional disparities in 
the EU. The third cohesion report (European Commission, 2004c) declares 
that studies show that some convergence across the EU among countries 
has occurred, owing to the so-called ‘beta convergence’: the observed 
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poorer countries to catch up. Independent studies confirm this, but the 
impact in the last programming period of 2000–06 was weaker than during 
the 1989–94 programming period, somewhat undermining the ability of the 
report to easily defend regional policy. This weaker growth has caused 
scepticism about the merits of regional policy. Against this criticism it is 
possible to argue that the 1990s saw several global economic crises, first 
caused by Russia and then by the Asian markets. Regional policy may have 
cushioned the weakest EU regions from decline, which also has its merits. 
It is actually difficult to judge the base scenario. 
In addition, growth rates diminish as regions become wealthier for 
two reasons. The first relates to magnitude, as small increases in wealth in 
nominal terms are higher in percentage and real terms. This stems from a 
combination of a generally smaller GDP, which makes every extra increase 
larger in percentage terms, and the usually lower price levels in the poorer 
regions, which ensure that every euro invested and every euro returned 
has a higher value in real terms. Prices and the cost of capital and labour 
rises in those regions that become wealthier. The latter consequences 
increase the complexity and longer-term maturity of ‘second round’ 
investments. Investments suffer from decreasing marginal returns, and 
once a region’s basic investments with rapid returns are completed, every 
additional investment tends to become more costly and require a longer 
maturity period. Some more complex investments for the long term, such 
as investments in the education system, may not have a significant effect 
during the time span of single financial perspectives, but may be crucial for 
the future. 
The latest reforms in the cohesion policy, calling for a redirection of 
funds towards actions in line with the Lisbon agenda, also reflect the 
decreasing marginal returns on infrastructure. Once the basic infrastructure 
is in place, the returns from investing in more of the same may have little or 
no additional impact. Recognising this, the earmarking of cohesion funds 
for competitiveness-oriented investments makes sense.  
Another criticism of the cohesion policy, as the latest cohesion report 
admits, is that the divergences in GDP per capita among regions have not 
narrowed, i.e. the so-called ‘sigma’ convergence. There is some evidence 
that it has even worsened (ESPON, 2006). Regional growth has 
concentrated in some regions. This trend has triggered the criticism that 
regional policy is failing to deliver. This argument is flawed and short-
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different development potential can equalise their GDP per capita, with the 
result of seeing Andalusia or Algarve approaching the GDP per capita of, 
for example, Cataluña. Regional growth potential is limited by the 
location’s endowments and patterns of demand for those endowments. 
There are some regions with more endogenous growth potential than 
others and it is therefore normal that growth is uneven. Furthermore, as 
Martin (1998) reports, financial and other assistance to businesses in 
wealthy member states is often higher than the total assistance in the 
poorer regions including that by structural funds, which reduces the ability 
of EU regional funds to generate a catching-up effect.  
While investments in poorer regions in Europe make sense, 
unjustified over-investment can have higher opportunity costs for the 
wealthier regions from which the transfers come. Beyond a certain 
investment mass, returns in the convergence regions may be negligible 
while lost opportunities elsewhere may not. The cut-off point is an issue of 
dispute and has grown in controversy with the economic slowdown in the 
EU in the past decade. 
Regional and cohesion funds have suffered from the side effects of 
the pork-barrel approach to funding allocation. One of the most notable 
cases is the former Objective 6, which became part of Objective 1, and in 
turn allowed support to be given to regions with a low population density 
over a certain geographical latitude. This move is often regarded as having 
been compensation for Sweden and Finland in view of their lower CAP 
benefits. They are now no longer eligible for convergence funds. 
Cohesion funds are also considered the result of pressure by Spain to 
be compensated for the adverse effects of the internal market on Spain. 
They were conceived only for the period until the introduction of the single 
currency, but they have lingered for political reasons. This does not mean 
that cohesion funds are not useful, but that the decision to continue them 
was not taken based on efficiency criteria. 
Despite all the weaknesses of the policy, there is in any case an 
interesting indication that the structural funds or the EU in general has 
positive effects on regional economic development. Plotting real GDP 
growth rates for all Objective 1 regions (Figure 7) during the period 2001 to 
2004 indicates that none of them has seen their GDP per capita idecrease, 
and what is more important, with two or three rare exceptions, nominal 
GDP growth was above the average inflation rate. This is probably an 
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one would expect more ‘declining’ regions to worsen. Regional policy 
planning and investment has likely dampened decline where it loomed, 
and fostered economic growth; the EU’s regional policy support and the 
multi-annual programming approach is probably an important factor in 
this result, even if such a statement is difficult to prove.  
Figure 7. Average real GDP per capita growth rates, all Objective 1 regions,   
2001  to 2004 
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Source: Data derived from Eurostat. 
 
One of the main weaknesses of the policy is simultaneously one of its 
greatest strengths, in that the planning and implementation process 
depends heavily on the national and regional authorities. The commitment 
of member states’ administrations to the success of the investments and the 
quality of interventions is of paramount importance. 
The European Commission’s power in the project selection process 
for the majority of the funds is limited. Most of the implementation and 
control occurs atthe national level. This clearly leaves to member states the 
control over the performance of the funds. In addition, the Commission’s 
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success has fostered their suboptimal use in the pursuit of fast 
expenditures. The uneven performance of funds can often be traced to the 
lack of implementation quality in the member states. 
There has been a shift in the Commission’s position on this issue, 
with more emphasis on integrated planning and recently the requirement 
to earmark expenditures for Lisbon-oriented initiatives. The performance of 
the funds, however, is still mainly in the hands of the member states. The 
Commission has little authority during implementation to check the quality 
of the projects approved. It only has blunt legal instruments to act in cases 
of fraud – for blocking the funds and bringing a member state to the 
European Court of Justice if the fraudulent operations are not effectively 
pursued at the national level.  
Research on the performance and value added of the structural and 
cohesion funds is largely inconclusive (Table 8). Some argue that the 
overall value added may be negative owing to the opportunity costs. 
Nevertheless, there are signs that the success of the structural funds is 
closely related to the quality of programming, and it probably has had 
positive effects in countries like Spain and Ireland for this reason. 
Table 8. Performance of the cohesion policy in achieving its objectives 
Objectives  Quality of intervention, achievement of objective 
ERDF aims at 
reducing disparities 
between the levels of 
development 
Inconclusive. Convergence among regions has not been 
achieved, but this is not a realisable objective, as poorer 
regions often lack the endowments to match the growth 
rates of richer regions. What is important is how the 
regions would have fared in the absence of the EU’s 
policy. 
The ERDF is still largely encumbered by distributional 
problems with the allocation of the funds by country – an 
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Table 8, cont. 
ESF aims at 
improving 
productivity, 
increasing job rates 
and social inclusion 
and cohesion 
Mixed/weak. It is unclear what the role of the EU should 
be. Often the effects of measures are weak and ineffective 
because of national policies, such as rigidities induced by 
labour market legislation. 
 
 
Cohesion funds assist 
the eligible member 
states to catch up 
with Europe’s 
wealthier regions 
Positive/mixed. Some countries have developed quickly, 
while others are still lagging behind. The effectiveness of 
the policy depends on the implementation quality in the 
recipient country. 
 
Theoretically, structural and cohesion funds score well on the 
principles for EU intervention (Table 9), but the problem of the policy lies 
in the individual policy actions. An analysis and re-evaluation of the 
quality and appropriateness of certain eligible measures should be 
undertaken. 
Table 9. Score on the principles for intervention for the cohesion policy 
Compulsory 
Subsidiarity  Pass. It is a transnational redistributive policy and thus 
supranational in nature. Programming and 
implementation of the funds are correctly in the hands 
of the recipient countries and regions. In the areas of 
evaluation, auditing and control, however, the roles of 
the national administrations and the EU should be 
reviewed. 
Proportionality  Weak. The structural funds and cohesion funds still 
need to be improved to enable them to achieve their 
objectives. It is unclear if the policy can or should 
achieve the objective of reducing interregional 
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Table 9, cont. 
Additionality  Pass. This quality is a fundamental obligation for the 
policy and evidence suggests that it is adhered to in 
principle. 
Value for money  Weak. There are indications that the policies could be 
improved.  
Value for money  Weak. There are indications that the policies could be 
improved.  
Highly recommended 
European public 
good 
Pass. The development of poorer regions is in the 
interest of the EU. 
European added 
value 
Weak. Intervention in the poorest countries and 
regions is generally thought necessary. The value 
added of €1 invested in the poorest region is held to 
exceed the value in a richer region. That being said, the 
opportunity costs for wealthier but still eligible regions 
are questionable. 
 
4.2.2. Indirect benefits of the cohesion policy 
Regional policy has also been attributed indirect benefits. The subsidiarity 
principle clearly ascribes the obligation of preparing the development plans 
to the regional–national level, with success very much in the hands of the 
beneficiary regions and countries. This tactic has encouraged the 
development of better multi-annual, strategic planning exercises and 
important administrative reforms in member states. Even if not perfect, 
these changes have been healthy. The learning element embedded in the 
preparation of the strategic documents and programmes should not be 
underestimated. These tasks induce a change in the attitude towards the 
economy for public administrations, forcing them to become more 
proactive. Even in wealthier member states, the existence of regional funds 
have allowed the regions some emancipation from central government, 
enabling them to develop strategies of their own, often better attuned to 
regional needs. The importance of this process even in traditionally richer, 
centralised countries like France has been documented by Cole (2003).  
EU procurement rules, while cumbersome, have pushed forward the 
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capacity and efficiency, and contribute to an improvement in transparency 
and fraud reduction. Therefore, despite all the misgivings of several 
member states on the misallocation of EU funds, the level of corruption 
related to EU funds is generally thought to be less compared with much 
public expenditure in member states. This point is important in respect of 
the new member states, where the control of public finances is generally 
poor and EU standards impose discipline. Despite possible losses, the long-
term effect is likely positive, speeding up the process of integration.  
4.2.3. Future of the convergence policy 
Should the EU be involved in regional policy? The answer as far as 
interregional redistribution is concerned is yes. Solidarity aspects of the EU 
are better handled at the EU level. The EU can play a role in fostering the 
growth of its poorer regions. Yet, the cohesion policy has come under 
scrutiny, and some analysts find that many of its actions are not justified.  
According to the Sapir report (Sapir et al., 2003) and as endorsed by 
some net contributors, there is a question about the need for regional policy 
to intervene in wealthier countries with eligible regions, leaving it to richer 
countries to finance their development. This position has some rationale 
from a purely economic point of view. Wealthier member states not only 
have more means to invest in their regions, but also their level of social 
support is generally higher. Additionally, net contributors could substitute 
the EU funds to the region with the money they would save by having to 
contribute less to regional policy.  
This argument, however, is generally rejected by the regions 
concerned, which do not see the national government investing in the 
region with an equivalent intensity. Regions also appreciate the 
empowerment EU regional funds gives them to define their own priorities. 
From a political point of view, there is also an important equity question: 
refusing support to poorer regions in wealthier countries runs counter to 
the principle of equal treatment among EU citizens, in that citizens in a 
similar situation (in terms of GDP per capita in PPP) are treated differently 
because of their location.  
Yet the merit of this last point is debatable as similar GDP per capita 
in a region does not de facto mean a similar interpersonal situation. 
Regions with a similar GDP per capita in PPP say nothing about the 
comparative state of infrastructure, social security intensity or public 
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In any case, the introduction of national wealth as an addition to the 
regional GDP per capita criterion for eligibility would fundamentally 
change the nature of the policy. It would lose its EU-wide character. The 
choice cannot be decided based on an economic rationale alone and it has 
heavy political connotations. 
Any radical changes in the cohesion policy of the EU should be taken 
with the recognition that it has been one of the most interesting and 
important components of the budget and of EU integration in general. The 
EU’s cohesion policy is unique for an intergovernmental association of 
countries, even if preceded by the example of the Marshall Plan. Changes 
have to be undertaken with care, but it needs improvements, particularly 
•  an increase in policy coherence and growth orientation, and 
•  an increase in the national responsibility for expenditures. 
Increase in policy coherence and growth orientation 
There is growing opinion that a successful use of structural funds requires 
much more than a carpet development of infrastructures and needs well-
developed strategies and goals. The ‘Irish miracle’ and the exceptional 
growth in some Spanish regions for example, have been driven as much by 
the administrative capacity to absorb funds as by entrepreneurship and 
well-defined actions.  
Policy coherence is crucial. Rigid national labour-market policies, 
burdensome fiscal policies or ill-defined social policies can limit the 
effectiveness of investments. When the framework conditions are right for 
growth, structural funds have assisted in fuelling it. Studies attribute to the 
structural funds an important contribution in countries like Ireland and 
Spain (Bradley et al., 2001; de la Fuente, 2002). The lack of strong 
performance in some regions of southern Italy for example, or in Greek 
regions (Leonardi, 1995), despite heavy support, can be greatly put down to 
a lack of coherent strategy and suboptimal national policies. This is clearly 
a valid message for all other areas of intervention, such as rural 
development or R&D.  
The present dispute on value added and the strategy for growth is 
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strategic focus10 i n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  n e w  r e q u i r ement for member states to 
prepare National Reform Programmes, which also attempt to induce more 
long-term economic planning and require an increase in the synergies 
among all policy actions.  
Increase in the national responsibility for expenditures 
In addition to policy coherence, governments should be encouraged to take 
an approach that is more strategic, to consult the stakeholders better and to 
produce programmes in partnership with the real drivers of economic 
development – private-sector entrepreneurs. Evaluation and the ability to 
redirect the strategy and funds according to circumstances during 
implementation are also important. The proactive involvement of the 
Commission services, the administrations and stakeholders must be 
fostered.  
A driver of excellence could be a periodic reassessment of funds to be 
allocated to member states and regions based on performance. Rather than 
encouraging the absorption of expenditure through measures such as the 
‘performance reserve’, the level of support could be conditional to 
sufficient tangible impacts on the economy. The present performance 
reserve is limited to rewarding programmes with additional funds based 
on efficiency indicators, which tend to be dominated by absorption-
capacity objectives. Instead of focusing on the release of additional funding 
as a positive encouragement, there is a need for a financial threat for the 
lack of tangible impacts. This is to ensure that funds are correctly spent 
with the aim of facilitating economic growth. Support should be time-
limited and the amount of future funding based on the extent to which 
objectives are achieved. It would be unfortunate if cuts in regional funds 
were implemented across the board, penalising successful regions for the 
underperformance of others. There is an additional imperative to make 
regional authorities accountable for their performance. 
Finally yet importantly, there is a need to review the evaluation, 
auditing and control of funding allocations. The evaluation process should 
                                                 
10 For the structural funds, the Community Strategic Guidelines document lists the 
guidelines for support, which require more coherent, long-term strategic planning 
by the member states. See European Commission, Communication on Cohesion 
Policy in Support of Growth and Jobs: Community Strategic Guidelines, 2007-2013 
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be in the hands of an independent agency, as the European Commission 
suffers from a strong contradictory pressure to ensure the ‘absorption’ of 
funds, which jeopardises its ability to press for the quality of the 
intervention planned ex ante or to act on weak results ex post. For auditing 
and control, the EU institutions have the final responsibility for the correct 
use of the funds, while the member states are responsible for implementing 
the policies, managing the appropriations and monitoring them. In this 
system of shared management between the EU and the member states, 
there are issues surrounding the division of competences and the 
attribution of accountability for the expenditures. Cipriani (2006 and 2007) 
closely examines the incoherent aspects of these arrangements, in which 
competence is widely devolved for implementing the EU budget while full 
accountability is lacking. 
4.3  Support for competitiveness 
The EU is facing growing challenges to its international economic position. 
Growth in the EU has been sluggish; it has performed weakly compared 
with the US and has encountered increasing competitive pressure in 
international markets. The world market expanded considerably in the 
1990s, as the Soviet Communist bloc collapsed. The period saw the 
introduction of large players, including China and India with their vast 
supplies of cheap labour (skilled and unskilled), creating a global 
downward pressure on wages. These changes have brought the 
controversial outsourcing problem (the importance of which has been 
widely exaggerated), but have also given rise to new competitors in areas 
in which the EU had felt relatively safe.  
The EU had based its expectations of economic growth on the 
conventional belief that high-tech products are the reserve of the most 
developed countries. The EU had even expected the new member states to 
be solely competitive in labour-intensive, low and medium value-added 
industries. With the basic technologies becoming cheaper and with 
telecommunications and transport systems developing rapidly, China, 
India and some of the new member states started investing in the 
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produce more engineers than do Europe or the US,11  and they have 
invested in the development of advanced regions the size of European 
countries. It is interesting to note that when India’s government took the 
decision in 1992 to develop high-technology centres, this step was 
dismissed by many as an eccentricity doomed to fail; instead, it was a 
success (Sachs, 2005). Europe now finds itself under competitive pressure at 
all product levels.  
Until recently, the resources of the EU budget were concentrated on 
cohesion and problem areas. Successful ventures were assumed to be self-
generating and self-sustaining. Investment for companies was mostly 
limited to cohesion regions and industries in decline (Objective 2). The idea 
of fostering research and companies in the frontline of the market was an 
anathema for a budget developed for cohesion. 
With a declining working population and the growing loss of some 
of the main ‘absolute’ comparative advantages,12 the EU needs to improve 
its competitiveness while maintaining the value of its products. These aims 
require significant investment and effort if the EU is to retain its economic 
position and the living standards of its citizens.  
The EU has introduced a number of measures for promoting the 
competitiveness of Europe and its capacity to face the challenges ahead. 
The EU budget is expected to intervene in the most appropriate form, 
bearing in mind the subsidiarity principle, and hence support those actions 
that are better served at the supranational level. 
Recognising the need to foster the top as well as the bottom of the 
market (given the role the top plays in supporting the bottom), the 
European Commission proposed for the next financial perspective to bring 
existing pilot programmes on research, support for start-ups and 
connectivity across Europe to the forefront of EU policy intervention. A 
large and distinct budget was created under the new heading of 
                                                 
11 There are some doubts about the actual quality of the skills attained by many of 
the graduating engineers, however. As reported by a number of news sources, a 
study recently commissioned by the Indian National Association of Software & 
Service Companies has found that only one in four engineering graduates is 
employable.  
12 High-tech consumer products were concentrated in the US, Japan and Europe. 
This group could once be said to have possessed an ‘absolute’ comparative 
advantage in front of the rest of the world, but that is changing. THE UK REBATE AND THE CAP – PHASING THEM BOTH OUT? | 39 
 
competitiveness and employment. This heading finances those policies 
equivalent to the present Objective 2, but also R&D and trans-European 
transport corridors and the connectivity of energy networks.  
The new financial perspective also reinforces actions that are deemed 
important for the future competitiveness of the EU. The competitiveness 
heading increases and expands the EU’s interventions for the development 
of SMEs, education and lifelong learning programmes and the Trans-
European Networks (TENs). The European Parliament managed to 
increase funding for programmes that are linked to competitiveness and 
employment by €4 billion. It increased by €2.5 billion the funds of the 
European Investment Bank to support SMEs and European transport 
networks. While investment in competitiveness is certainly a positive idea, 
the role of the EU funds is not clear. The value added of intervention at the 
EU level is still under debate. 
4.3.1. Intervention for SMEs 
From a theoretical point of view, the EU can play a role in assisting the 
development of SMEs when it is part of a European restructuring process. 
SME development also depends on national incentives and regulations.  
Public financing for SME development can generally have the effect 
of substitution for private financial sources. Still, the latest comprehensive 
evaluation financed by the European Commission claims that the policy 
has significantly added value, and that without this intervention 75% of the 
SMEs assisted would never have formed (European Commission, 1999). A 
recently completed evaluation of some of the programmes for SMEs 
(Renda, Schrefler & van Dewal, 2006) concludes that this is indeed an 
acceptable EU policy even if there is scope for improvement (see also Table 
10). There is not yet enough research in this area to support any strong 
argument for or against SME support in non-convergence areas of the EU. 
A thorough revision of the schemes to assist SMEs should be 
undertaken to ensure that the EU is not substituting its assistance for that of 
national or private funding institutions. There are sometimes puzzling 
concerns that EU schemes for SMEs are not taken up in some regions 
because national schemes are easier to use. In those cases where there is no 
underprovision of national funding, the EU schemes simply should not be 
offered. Furthermore, national support is already regulated by EU state-aid 
rules. Only in countries or regions that lack provision owing to inadequate 
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Table 10. Score on the principles of intervention for SME assistance  
Compulsory 
Subsidiarity  Unclear.  EU support should be limited to areas in 
which state resources are too low to provide assistance. 
Proportionality  Unclear.  The level of intervention needed at the EU 
level is an issue of open debate. 
Additionality  Unclear.  There is a risk of substitution of private 
finance or state aids.  
Value for money  Unclear 
Highly recommended 
European public good  Pass if well devised 
European added value  Pass if effective 
4.3.2. Research and development 
Innovation is recognised as a key factor for the growth and the future 
sustainability of the European economy. It is well documented, however, 
that the EU spends less as a share of GDP on R&D than the US or Japan 
(Table 11). The European Commission has thus proposed a substantial rise 
in funds for research and investments leading to increased competitiveness. 
But finance from public funding as a share of GDP is higher in the overall 
share of gross domestic expenditures on R&D (GERD). As a percentage of 
GDP, it is even higher than in Japan, which indicates that a significant part 
of the problem probably lies with private financing, which is considerably 
lower in the EU. 
Table 11. Gross domestic expenditures on R&D (GERD) as a % of GDP, 2003 
EU-25  US  Japan China 
Expenditure as a % of GDP   1.93   2.59   3.15   1.31  
Growth in GERD (annual real growth  
2000–03, %) 
2.4   0.4   2.2   18.6  
Share of public expenditure in GERD,  
2002 (%) 
34.0   31.0   18.0   – 
Share of public expenditure in GERD, as % of 
GDP), 2002 
0.66  0.80  0.57 – 
Share of private expenditure in GERD, as % 
of GDP, 2002  
1.27  1.79  2.58 – 
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While nobody argues that R&D does not need to increase, the source 
and type of R&D investments are important issues for debate. Is increasing 
R&D through the EU budget thus sensible at all? Is an increase in public 
spending on R&D actually a solution at all? Given the level of private R&D 
investment in the US and Japan, the EU and the member states should look 
hard at the existing regulations and policies. Why is Europe lagging 
behind? Is it because of a lack of public funding or an excessively rigid and 
innovation-unfriendly policy framework? Regulation, rigid labour markets, 
bureaucracy and unsuitable fiscal regimes may well be the underlying 
reason for Europe’s straggling performance. Even with greater public 
expenditures, the situation is unlikely to improve if the inefficiencies that 
are at the root of the private sector lethargy remain – with a rise in public 
spending at best representing a less than optimal solution. The possible 
allocative inefficiencies from decisions that are not market-led could easily 
reduce the value of any public funding increase. 
Moreover, the EU’s approach to R&D may well be ineffective and 
even counterproductive. Gros & Micossi (2005) are very critical about the 
strategy for R&D investment through the EU budget, judging it wasteful 
and politically influenced, and they recommend a substantial change in the 
rules. 
Nevertheless, some actions can be considered of EU interest, for 
which EU funding has seen positive outcomes. The EU has been 
experimenting with different pilot projects since 1994, including the 
Regional Innovation Strategies and Regional Technology Transfer 
initiatives. In the programming period 2000–06, these initiatives evolved to 
form a central strategic goal, which is to develop the European research 
area. The European Framework Programmes and pilot programmes for 
regional cooperation and for innovation (such as the PAXIS programme) 
have grown stronger year by year.  
There is evidence that EU funding in R&D has been successful where 
critical mass and cross-border benefits exist despite the sums representing 
less than 6% of total EU spending on R&D. It has helped to prevent 
duplicated and fragmented research where coordination and economies of 
scale are important. While there is broad agreement that the role of the EU 
budget could be stronger, there is not a consensus about what size it should 
be or the specific purposes for which it should be used. The potential for 
the misallocation of resources is significant, and experimenting with the EU 
budget does not address the fundamental problem of a negative business 
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Generally, EU funding directed at R&D and at fostering 
competitiveness should be allocated according to excellence. Countries or 
regions should not be able, as is the case for agricultural, rural and 
structural funding, to capture a predetermined budget allocation for their 
country. With today’s discussions so concentrated on net balances, the 
interest of member states in supporting an increase in funding for this 
heading has been weak. There is a high risk that the larger pie, the more 
likely it will be divided on a political basis, undermining its effectiveness.  
Well-targeted interventions for R&D are potentially clearly in line 
with fiscal federalism and all the principles for EU interventions. Yet the 
actual performance of R&D spending is mixed, partly because of a lack of 
funds. At this stage, it is incorrect to judge the potential of the funds based 
on the limited interventions of the past. Nonetheless, the potential for 
misallocation has to be taken very seriously with respect to extending the 
scope of the funds. In addition, public authorities have a mixed record in 
picking the most successful ventures. 
There are, however, areas where EU funding would be undisputedly 
beneficial if well allocated – in spending to address global challenges and 
long-term needs, such as reductions to greenhouse gas emissions beyond 
2030. Funds for adaptation to climate change and mitigation technologies, 
for the EU and non-EU countries (especially developing ones), cannot be 
provided by market forces alone. Markets are unable to offer the incentives 
for such long-term technological needs (see Fisher et al., 2007).  
The EU budget can provide important leverage funding, to induce 
further investments in the public and private sectors (see Table 12). 
Table 12. Score on the principles for intervention for R&D policy 
Compulsory 
Subsidiarity  Pass. There is a clear role for research funding at the EU 
level to reduce duplication and increase economies of 
scale. Large EU-wide and global challenges are better 
dealt with supranationally. 
Proportionality  Unclear. The optimal funding at the EU level is unclear. 
But for some challenges such as climate change and 
mitigation technologies, the needs have been estimated. 
Additionality  Pass. Officially, funding R&D is held to be additional, 
but substitution effects should be checked. EU funds 
should not reduce costs that firms would incur anyway. 
Grants for researchers may substitute employees.  THE UK REBATE AND THE CAP – PHASING THEM BOTH OUT? | 43 
 
Table 12, cont. 
Value for money  Pass. This assessment is given with reservations, 
however. R&D financing by the EU level can potentially 
lead to important economies of scale. Yet the private 
sector in the EU clearly lacks dynamism. The value of 
changing the market incentives to unleash private R&D 
efforts may be greater. Eliminating indirect regulatory 
barriers between member states to encourage private 
transnational and corporate R&D is recommended. Still, 
for long-term global challenges, EU funding is 
important. 
Highly recommended 
European public good  Pass. This view applies to research that the market 
would not have provided. 
European added value  Pass. This assessment applies to global challenges such 
as transnational pollution and long-term challenges. 
 
4.3.3. Trans-European Networks 
TENs are viewed as a fundamental ingredient for efficient, developed 
markets. The objectives are reasonable as ideas: to ensure that transport 
connections enable cross-border trade, to facilitate connectivity across 
countries for energy, to stimulate competition among providers and to 
provide energy security. The fund assists in the creation of TENs by 
financing transport and energy connectivity, but is this necessary? 
TENs for transport are also financed by the cohesion funds in 
countries with a GDP per capita under 90% of the EU average; thus, the 
budget in the competitiveness heading is for those not benefiting from 
cohesion funds. The advantages of funding transport connections in 
wealthier member states through the budget are questionable and may 
conflict with the additionality criterion. In these cases, the need for EU 
funds should be reassessed.  
Regarding energy markets, it is true that they are dominated by 
national players, which have underinvested in connectivity to other 
countries. There is no economic incentive for the energy suppliers, which 
often have a monopoly or near monopoly in their country, to connect to 
foreign grids. The EU can open these markets by financing the required 
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security. Special pipelines ready to shift to other suppliers could be built. 
There is indeed a case in favour of EU action in both areas, but further cost-
benefit analysis should be undertaken (Table 13). 
Table 13. Score on the principles of intervention for TENs 
Compulsory 
Subsidiarity  Pass.  Yet,  this view would not always hold for 
transport funding. 
Proportionality  Unclear  
Additionality  Pass. But it may fail in wealthier member states. 
Value for money  Pass. The possibilities to build up economies of scale 
are substantial; however, for energy security, there is a 
need to evaluate costs and benefits better.  
Highly recommended 
European public good  Pass  
European added value  Pass 
 
4.4  Security and external action 
Security, defence and external action are important areas of intervention in 
which the EU would be better placed to act. The financial allocation is far 
from enough and the policies are too underdeveloped.  
On external action, the EU budget does not reflect the ambitions of 
the EU abroad, nor does it provide the necessary means to fulfil its present 
objectives.  
The EU has critical interests in engaging with its neighbourhood. The 
political stability and economic development of neighbouring areas bring 
opportunities for the EU and are of major importance. The EU is seen by 
most of its neighbours as an ideal to emulate. Membership is sought, with 
countries engaging in lengthy, difficult and expensive reforms to secure 
trade access or approach and adopt the EU acquis, which is heavily loaded 
with costly political and economic requirements.  
The EU’s influence in its neighbourhood is principally based on 
persuasion rather than power. Access to Europe’s markets, the benefits of 
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geography of Eastern Europe at a record-breaking speed. These changes 
are also largely related to the EU’s introduction of conditionalities to its 
programmes (PHARE, TACIS, CARDS, etc.). Yet its influence spreads 
beyond its neighbourhood, through its international aid programmes. 
Despite the reliance of the EU on support through association agreements, 
pre-accession programmes and aid to secure stability, influence and future 
trade partnerships, the external action budget of the EU is still very limited. 
The economies of scale that can be achieved through external action at the 
EU level are very significant, while the EU’s weight in global security 
affairs is meagre without a pooling of resources. 
In addition, the EU is criticised for its lack of resources to handle 
external programmes. The EU actually relies heavily on external 
consultants with varying success. The member states, however, 
paradoxically refuse to allow the EU administration to increase in line with 
the responsibilities they have bestowed on it. 
As for internal security, the member states have been remarkably 
unwilling to extend the EU’s involvement in this field. Gros & Micossi 
(2005) are surprised that in an area in which citizens are clearly demanding 
more coordinated action, so little interest is being shown. The fact that this 
heading is so underfunded partly stems from the political reluctance to 
shift resources from the CAP and structural funds to internal or external 
actions (Table 14).  
Table 14. Score on the principles of intervention for security and external action 
Compulsory 
Subsidiarity  Pass  
Proportionality  Unclear. But by having separate and often incompatible 
national structures, expenditures are higher than is 
necessary for the present standards. 
Additionality  Pass. There is strong potential for action beyond that 
possible for member states in isolation. 
Value for money  Pass.  The potential is substantial, but the tendency of 
member states to maintain high national control over 
supranational ventures can be damaging, as in the 
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Table 14, cont. 
Highly recommended 
European public good  Pass. Security is an important public good. Stability in 
third countries is very important for the long-term 
security of the EU. 
European added value  Pass.  Security and stability provide inestimable added 
value to the EU. 
 
5.  Conclusions on the expenditures 
The EU budget is changing in nature. What began as a tool primarily 
designed to compensate the agricultural sector and later regions and 
member states for perceived inequalities in the evolution of the single 
market, is changing into a tool to foster growth in the EU and face other, 
growing global challenges. 
The budget is now in a transitory state and will continue to be so for 
some time. It has travelled a long way from the days when expenditures 
were mostly concentrated on dumping or destroying agricultural 
production surpluses. With the single market and the single currency, the 
needs of the EU have altered and new ones have arisen, including a 
response to globalisation. 
The budget is increasingly required to play a role more in line with 
these new challenges, and the pressure is mounting to depoliticise it. The 
interventions should thus follow the criteria for public and supranational 
budgets outlined in this report. Fulfilling these criteria is in addition to 
incorporating the attributes of subsidiarity, additionality and value for 
money. Furthermore, as a European budget it should target European 
public goods that generate a European added value. Policies should reduce 
the waste of resources and when important objectives are not able to foster 
growth, they should at least minimise any negative implications on growth. 
These steps require important changes in the budget. With respect to 
the CAP, the payments should better reflect the costs to achieve the 
objectives. Payments should be made much more efficient and concentrate 
on areas and farms in need.  
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Concerning the structural funds, the policies should be revisited to 
increase their growth orientation. Their effectiveness depends strongly on 
the quality of the national strategies. The allocation of funds should be 
based on performance in the use of those funds. 
Regarding the competitiveness funds, there is a risk of misallocation 
of resources. In the case of R&D, the strong focus on public funding (at 
either the EU or national level) is too narrow. The main deficiency is the 
low share of private funding of R&D, which most probably stems from 
regulatory bottlenecks. The EU’s R&D funding should concentrate on 
global and long-term technological challenges, such as adapting to and 
mitigating climate change in the future, where markets are too uncertain to 
attract private investment. 
The EU needs more resources for security and external action, as the 
EU is not able to live up to its ambitions in these fields. Cooperation and 
the pooling of resources in these areas are among the most-effective 
optimisation strategies, if well designed.  
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PART II. THE OWN RESOURCES SYSTEM 
he own resources system of the EU draws much criticism. The most 
repeated accusations are that the system is unfair, that it is opaque 
and that it is not really ‘own resources’, because it largely consists of 
direct transfers from the member states. This part of the report describes 
the structure of the own resources system and its development, with 
specific attention given to the UK rebate. It assesses the merits and flaws of 
the present system, alternative proposals for deriving EU revenue and 
essential elements to consider in any reforms. 
6.  Summary of the own resources system 
There are three main resources for the EU: 
1)  Traditional own resources (TOR). These are the original first resources, 
largely composed of common customs duties and a small amount of 
agricultural and sugar levies. These are regarded as fully owned by 
the EU owing to the geographical arbitrariness of the final 
consumption.13  
2)  VAT resource. This resource is based on value-added tax receipts. It 
was established in 1980 to cover the insufficiency of the TOR and 
conceived as a tax on consumption. It is calculated on a notional 
harmonised VAT base, as in reality VAT diverges significantly 
among member states. Prior to 2007, the VAT ‘rate of call’ 
                                                 
13 The well-known ‘Rotterdam effect’ is a good example. Rotterdam, being a major 
point of entry for goods to the EU raises a substantial share of the total customs 
receipts of the EU. With the exception of a 25% retention for ‘administrative costs’, 
the duties are owned officially by the EU budget and not by the Netherlands. 
Hence, the EU does not regard the receipts from customs duties as part of the 
Netherlands’ national contribution for the calculation of the country’s net balance, 
despite the insistence of the Netherlands on doing so.  
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contribution to the budget was set at 0.5%. The new financial 
perspective cuts the cap to 0.3% of GNI from 2007 onwards, with 
deeper cuts for Austria (to 0.225%), Germany (to 0.15%) and the 
Netherlands (to 0.1%). These reductions further reinforce the GNI 
equivalence of the VAT resource. This resource has also seen a ‘cap’ 
imposed on the base at 50% of each member state’s GNI, because it 
was considered regressive (generally poorer member states have a 
higher share of consumption in GNI due than richer member states, 
although this is also the case for the UK because of its specific market 
characteristics). The effect is that for many countries,14 the VAT 
contribution is equivalent to the next resource, directly based on 
GNI.  
3)  The GNI resource. As costs soon exceeded the TOR and VAT 
resources, a resource based on the GNI of member states was created 
in 1988 to cover the ‘residual’ (now the largest) share of the budget. 
The Netherlands and Sweden are to benefit from reductions in their 
contributions to this resource for the 2007–13 period of €605 million 
and €150 million respectively, i.e. lump sum rebates. 
The system of own resources ensures that the EU can cover the 
necessary expenditures and that contributions beyond the TOR and before 
any rebates are generally in line with the GNI of member states (in terms of 
their contributory capacity).15  
6.1  History of the UK rebate 
In the 1980s, the UK – whose agricultural sector has a different structure to 
that of other member states – found itself a large net contributor to the 
budget, despite being one of the poorest members in the then European 
Community of nine countries. The European Community’s expenditures 
were principally composed of agricultural spending. The UK rebate was 
largely a reaction to the regressiveness of the CAP policy and the 
                                                 
14 The European Commission report on own resources (2004b) notes that for 2005, 
13 out of 25 member states had a VAT base exceeding 50% of their GNI. 
15 Baldwin (2005a) does not consider this system an equitable one, as the payments 
are not progressive (rich countries do not pay more as a share of GNI, as in normal 
taxation systems). Nevertheless, a progressive system would increase the negative 
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disproportionate support for specific products in the agricultural sector, as 
well as the UK’s relative lack of prosperity at that time. 
The basic mechanism was decided in Fontainebleau in June 198416 
and given effect by the Council Decision of 7 May 1985.17 The contribution 
of the UK to the Community budget is reduced by an amount equal to 66% 
of its net balance.  
The UK’s contributory imbalance is calculated as being the difference 
between the amount paid by the UK (excluding the contributions that are 
‘owned’ by the EU, the TOR) and the amount of expenditure from the EU 
budget that has taken place in and for the benefit of the UK, excluding 
external actions, but interestingly including administrative expenditure.  
The calculation is complex, with adaptations introduced to either 
counterbalance the effects of changes in the system, such as the 
introduction of a resource based on GNI, or the transformation after 
enlargement of external expenditure into internal expenditure. The 
adaptations for the current own resources system are summarised below:  
•  The calculation of the amount of the refund is as if the budget were 
still fully financed under the pre-1988 system, based solely on VAT.  
•  There is a reduction of the resulting amount of the rebate by the 
‘savings’ (the so-called ‘UK advantage’) the UK derives from the 
modifications introduced in 1988 and 1999. Technical adjustments 
neutralise windfall gains resulting from the progressive reduction of 
the VAT key and the increase in the retained share of the TOR. 
•  The system of financing the UK rebate has been altered in an ad hoc 
fashion. In 1999, changes were made to enable Germany, the 
Netherlands, Austria and Sweden to reduce their contribution 
towards the rebate by 25% of the unadjusted amount, thereby 
                                                 
16 The general principle of the Fountainbleau Agreement is that “any Member State 
sustaining [a] budgetary burden which is excessive in relation to its relative 
prosperity may benefit from a correction at the appropriate time” (European 
Council, Conclusions of the Session of the European Council at Fontainebleau, 25-
26 June 1984). 
17 See Council Decision 85/257/EEC, Euratom of 7 May 1985 on the Communities’ 
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shifting the burden onto the remaining member states (Art. 2(3) of 
the Own Resources Decision, 2000).18 
•  The UK’s rebate is also adapted to avoid undue increases caused by 
changes stemming from enlargement. The calculation of the UK 
rebate excludes an amount equal to pre-accession expenditures (and 
thus external action) in the candidate countries before enlargement. 
These expenditures have since become EU internal expenditures 
under cohesion and rural development funding (Art. 4(f), Own 
Resources Decision, 2000), but remain outside the rebate formula. 
6.2  New system for the period 2007–13 
For own resources, the final agreement19 is very complex. The UK 
maintains the present rebate, and accepts the exclusion of all expenditure 
for the new member states (with the exception of the CAP) from the 
calculation of the rebate. This adjustment is to be phased in from 2009 and 
be fully introduced in 2011. In addition, the maximum amount of additional 
funding by the UK cannot exceed €10.5 billion over the period 2007–13, 
compared with the contributions under the present mechanism. It is 
important to note that the UK has proposed the cut in the rebate in such a 
way as to maintain the rebate on the expenditures for the EU-15, as well as 
on the CAP and part of the rural development funds in the new member 
states. Furthermore, the agreement clearly states that this should continue 
after 2013. 
As noted above, in 2007 the VAT rate of call has been cut to 0.3% of 
GNI, with deeper cuts for Austria (to 0.225%), Germany (to 0.15%) and the 
Netherlands (to 0.1%). The Netherlands and Sweden are also to benefit 
from reductions in contributions for the 2007–13 period of €605 million and 
€150 million respectively.  
7.  Assessing the present own resources 
Despite many misgivings, the current system has certain important 
advantages, which makes it difficult to find comparable alternatives: 
                                                 
18 See Council Decision 2000/597/EC, Euratom of 29 September 2000 on the 
Communities’ system of own resources, OJ L 253, 07.10.2000. 
19 See Council Decision 2007/436/EC, Euratom of 7 June 2007 on the system of the 
European Communities’ own resources, OJ L 163, 23.6.2007. 52 | NÚÑEZ FERRER 
 
simplicity and cost effectiveness (of the basic system before rebates and 
concessions), long-term stability and predictability, a guarantee of 
budgetary balance and a distribution of the burden among member states 
closely proportional to GNI. 
Additionally, from the point of view of fairness of the contributions, 
the present sources of financing (TOR, virtually harmonised VAT and GNI 
contributions) score well. These contributions are strongly correlated with 
the contributory capacity of the member states as expressed in national 
income. The UK rebate and other concessions to individual member states 
affect this relationship and undermine the fairness of contributions. At the 
same time, the origin of these corrections is to be found in the distributional 
implications of expenditure policies. Member states do not openly 
challenge the notion of contributions based on the share of GNI, but rather 
those deviating from it. 
Fairness of own resources is thus intrinsically linked to the existence 
of EU expenditure policies that all member states accept to finance in full. 
As the then UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, made perfectly clear in the 
speech to the European Parliament in June 2005, changes in the UK rebate 
are only negotiable in exchange for reform of the expenditure policies, with 
a clear reference to the CAP. Fairness in own resources is in this sense 
directly connected with expenditures. 
Nevertheless, it is also true that over the years the UK rebate has 
become excessive owing to various factors. The first was the existence of an 
implicit assumption when the rebate mechanism was developed in 1984 
that the relative wealth of the UK would stay constant. It is a curious 
contradiction that while the rebate has over the years accumulated a 
number of intricate corrections for policy changes, TOR adaptations, etc., 
no provision has been made to counterbalance the possible reversal of 
fortunes for the UK, i.e. its transformation from one of the poorest to one of 
the wealthiest EU member states.  
As contributions are closely related to wealth, the UK contributions 
have increased, simultaneously increasing the size of the rebate. The rebate has 
also further grown with cohesion expenditures, of which the UK is not a 
main recipient. The UK has not challenged its contribution to regional 
policy, thus undermining the rigid position it has held over the years on the 
rebate. Projections into the future show that the UK is set to become one of 
the smallest net contributors, while being one of the wealthiest member 
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policy remaining relatively stable, the increase in the rebate cannot be 
defended based on the cost of the CAP.  
Table 15. Net balances with and without the rebate, Commission proposal (% GNI) 
Net budgetary balances before the 
rebate, est. average 2008–13 
  Net budgetary balances after the 
rebate, est. average 2008–13 
UK -0.62  Netherlands  -0.56 
Netherlands -0.55  Germany  -0.54 
Germany -0.52  Sweden  -0.5 
Sweden -0.47  Italy  -0.41 
Austria -0.37  Austria  -0.38 
Italy -0.29  Cyprus  -0.37 
Cyprus -0.28  France  -0.37 
France -0.27  Denmark  -0.31 
Denmark -0.2  Finland  -0.25 
Finland -0.14  UK  -0.25 
Sources: European Commission (2004b), Table 3, p. 21 and Table 4, p. 23. (annual 
averages, 2008–13 based on the Commission’s original financial perspectives proposal – 
see European Commission, 2004d). 
 
In addition, the fairness of the rebate is increasingly questionable as 
more net contributors reach a net position similar to that of the UK. As 
noted earlier, the Fontainebleau Agreement of 1984 describing the 
principles of the rebate, states that “any Member State sustaining [a] 
budgetary burden which is excessive in relation to its relative prosperity 
may benefit from a correction at the appropriate time”. If the net balance is 
excessive for the UK, then, according to the wording of the Agreement, 
other countries should benefit from a rebate under similar circumstances. 
7.1  Justification for the rebate today 
The EU has changed considerably since the rebate was introduced in 1984, 
and the UK rebate is under constant attack. It is said that the rebate is not 
justified because the UK no longer suffers any extraordinary, negative net 
balance before the rebate. On the other hand, the UK still claims that the 
rebate is justified. To a certain extent, both arguments are defensible. 54 | NÚÑEZ FERRER 
 
The UK retorts that the reason for the rebate is not the excessive net 
contribution, but the distortions in the expenditure that have prompted it; 
these are still present in the CAP. Other net contributors would therefore be 
less deserving of a rebate, as they have been supporting the policy mix and 
are often large recipients of CAP funds. This point is grosso modo correct – 
because of low CAP receipts the UK would pay significantly more than any 
other member state as a percentage of GNI without the rebate.  
Some ad hoc measures are in place, reducing the payments of the 
main net contributors to the UK rebate (a sort of rebate on the rebate), and 
there are new changes in the rate of VAT call and TOR contributions, 
designed to lessen the burden for some net contributors in the future. 
7.2  Reforming the own resources system 
Despite some weaknesses, the basic structure of the own resources system 
is fair and sustainable, but the multiple rebates and concessions that litter it 
are not. The ad hoc measures to benefit one or another country make the 
calculations of the contributions both opaque and extremely complex. Each 
budget discussion adds new formulae to benefit specific member states. 
The dispute over the rebate and the accumulation of distortions indicate 
the unsustainable nature of such changes. This means that the resources 
system is increasingly unstable and shifting away from a mechanism based 
on objective criteria.  
The European Commission presented in its 2004(b) report on own 
resources the GCM as a solution. This mechanism is a complicated system 
designed to grant automatic rebates to member states whose negative net 
contributions exceed a certain percentage of national GNI. Details of the 
system are presented in appendix 3. While the mechanism undoubtedly 
has some advantages, it does not offer any particular benefit to the net 
contributors above the present system. It also does not address the concerns 
about the origin of the problems, i.e. the expenditure policies. For example, 
the UK would lose a large part of the rebate while not gaining any change 
on the expenditure side. In addition, it also would introduce rebates as an 
automatic response to net contributions regardless of the merits of the 
policies financed. Should member states be allowed to obtain a rebate on 
policies that are the result of a consensus agreement? One should also add 
that there is no guarantee that the generalised mechanism would please net 
contributors and would avoid additional ad hoc measures for specific 
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In any case, it is also possible to consider a ‘reverse’ GCM, where a 
net contribution floor is imposed on wealthier countries, eliminating low 
and negative net contributions by those countries with a GDP per capita 
above the EU average. By the estimations of the author, if every country 
with a GDP per capita above the EU average were to finance a minimum of 
0.35% of GNI in 2013, this would reduce the contributions of other member 
states by €8 billion (administrative expenditure has been excluded from the 
calculation to avoid penalising Belgium and Luxembourg for housing the 
EU institutions). The redistribution of expenditures would reduce the 
contributions of other member states by 0.1% of GNI. For the UK, this 
system would have a nearly equivalent impact on its contributions in 2013, 
as with the system agreed. It would also remove from the net contributors 
any net balance consideration when deciding on any expenditure, such as 
the CAP. While such a system is unlikely to be agreed, the political 
implications are excellent food for thought. 
There are also calls to have the own resources more widely financed 
by direct fiscal means (i.e. taxes). Such a system would, according to the 
proponents, eliminate the rebates and increase the visibility of the EU 
budget for the citizens. A partial introduction of a tax system combined 
with a GCM has also been proposed, but simple calculations show that 
taxes that do not closely follow the GNI per capita distribution and can also 
cause incompatibility problems with the GCM (see appendix 4 for an 
illustration of such a case). 
The claim that direct tax-based resources would reduce net balance 
disputes is debatable, as the geographical origin of the tax collection point 
would be clear and would always be an issue of dissent, regardless of 
whether the item taxed fulfils the regional arbitrariness criteria or not.20 
This is the case already with the customs duties, i.e. the Rotterdam effect. In 
addition, tax resources need to fulfil specific criteria to become a 
functioning own resource and face significant technical difficulties in doing 
so.  
On visibility, national taxation systems are rarely very visible, and 
the importance for the EU budget of such visibility is disputable. Visibility 
can also be achieved by allowing member states to identify an EU 
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attributing the base of the tax to a particular member state, as in the examples of 
custom tariffs and cross-border pollution. 56 | NÚÑEZ FERRER 
 
component in a national tax (i.e. 2% of VAT, x% of income tax and so forth), 
whose yearly aggregate represents roughly the value of the transfer to the 
EU. Member states need not use a share of the same taxes. This would 
better represent the actual cost to citizens, as a visible tax (e.g. VAT) only 
covering part of the budget would not reflect the value of the contribution. 
Misinforming citizens by making only half of the contribution visible is not 
the objective.  
Proposals to just grant rebates through the expenditure side have 
usually been dismissed. Apart from the obvious bad image of such 
transparent transfers, one of the main arguments against them is that it 
would increase the size of the budget, while obscuring the real contribution 
of member states. That is not necessarily so. It can be countered that with 
respect to transparency, such an approach would make the rebates or 
‘reimbursements’ clear and illuminate the currently opaque reductions 
through rebates and alterations of the TOR, VAT or GNI. The basic own 
resources could then be based on common rules for all, as rebates would be 
undertaken through transfers from the budget. As to increasing the budget 
size, the budget ceiling would not be breached if such transfers were not 
counted as part of EU budget expenditures for its calculation. 
7.3  Alternative fiscal resources for the EU budget 
Reasons for changing the own resources system to introduce a stronger link 
between the EU citizen and the EU budget have been amply documented. 
Undoubtedly, there are justified reasons to increase the accountability of 
the EU budget for the citizens, as well as to clarify its functioning, i.e. 
improve the visibility.  
A large number of studies have been dedicated to analysing the 
positive and negative qualities of various taxation systems to provide the 
EU budget with the necessary resources.21 A number of taxes have been 
identified as most appropriate for the budget: a real VAT tax; excise duties 
on tobacco, alcohol and mineral oil; CO²/energy taxation; a corporate 
income tax; a communications tax; a personal income tax; a withholding tax 
on interest income; and most recently the introduction of a Tobin tax – a tax 
on short-term foreign exchange dealings. Nobel prize-winner James Tobin  
 
                                                 
21 See European Commission (1998 and 2004b), European Parliament (1997 and 
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proposed to reduce through this tax large international currency 
movements by foreign exchange speculators. This last idea has not taken 
hold; not only it is regarded as impractical for the EU, but also the tax is 
advocated for global transactions to raise funding for development 
countries and not for use by the EU for its own budget.  
It is not the intention here to reanalyse the merits of each taxation 
system but to concentrate on the problems and requirements faced by a 
system based solely on one or various of the taxes presented. Taxes at the 
EU level should fulfil certain criteria. These are stability, predictability and 
sufficiency; budgetary balance; a harmonised tax base; tax proportionality; 
fiscal neutrality; low additional administrative costs; and appropriate 
mechanisms to fix the taxation rates. It is not possible for one single tax to 
fulfil them all, but the combination of tax resources should be able to do so. 
Stability, predictability and sufficiency 
The present system has the positive feature of an automatic guarantee of 
resource predictability and adequacy. As the VAT and TOR resources 
already show, taxes are prone to suffer from yearly variations and 
differential impacts. A system based solely on taxation would have the 
drawback of being affected by cyclical variations, changes in consumer 
behaviour or the influence of economic slowdowns. 
There is also a problem with taxes connected to EU objectives, such 
as an environmental tax. As the taxes are supposed to induce behavioural 
changes on the part of citizens or entities (or both), a successful tax may be 
detrimental to the budget. For example, if a CO²/energy tax were to be 
successful in reducing energy consumption, then the yield of the tax would 
diminish, reducing its contribution to the own resources.  
The GNI key would remain a necessary tool, but changes in the yield 
of a tax in one country would affect the GNI contributions of other member 
states. Finally, the taxes may have major political implications. 
Budgetary balance 
The EU budget is required to be in balance. Using taxes as sole resources, 
the EU budget would have to be allowed to run surpluses or deficits – a 
point that would require a Treaty alteration. A direct fiscal resource that 
manages to raise the exact funding necessary to ensure a budgetary balance 
is not possible. There are bound to be deviations between appropriations  
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and expenditures. A GNI key for adjustments to the contributions of the 
member states would remain necessary, with the problems already 
mentioned above. 
Tax-base harmonisation 
The EU is characterised by the heterogeneity of fiscal systems, which 
creates a serious barrier to introducing an EU fiscal resource. Tax rates and 
tax bases in the member states diverge considerably. The tax rate and base 
differentiation is not only a political barrier. Economic efficiency also calls 
for differential tax systems for different economic circumstances. EU taxes 
would require equalising the bases and rates for equity reasons, with 
potentially detrimental effects on some member states. It is important to 
account for the overall welfare effect on the EU when choosing a fiscal 
resource. 
Tax proportionality 
A resource based on a national tax would be expected to be proportional to 
the country’s wealth, unless the tax fulfils the regional arbitrariness criteria 
acceptable to all member states. Harmonising tax bases does not ensure that 
proportionality would automatically be fulfilled, owing to the 
heterogeneity of member states’ economic structures and consumption 
patterns. The final impact would depend on the taxation method selected.  
The only tax that is proportional across countries is on income, as 
long as there is a harmonised base, which is not the case at present. The 
European Commission’s (2004b) report and recently one by the European 
Parliament (2007) identify VAT as a simple and easy tax to enforce, fully 
harmonising the base (transforming the presently virtual bases into real 
bases). Yet history shows that this is not as easy as it may sound. The VAT 
resource has been diminishing in importance and it has been capped 
because of the unequal incidence of the tax. Rebates and adjustments 
would likely soon follow. VAT is also affected by consumption patterns 
and other fiscal policies (including under-reporting and fraud).  
There have also been proposals for linking the tax to common 
objectives of the Community, such as a CO²/energy and transport tax or 
excise duties on alcohol or tobacco, some of which are proposed in the 
Commission’s own resources report of 2004(b). The bases are easier to 
harmonise, in a similar spirit as the common customs tariffs. But the 
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member states would remain, reinforcing (instead of weakening) the 
debates on net budgetary balances. Any system chosen would suffer from 
proportionality problems with a high probability of triggering fairness 
disputes. 
Fiscal neutrality 
Any EU tax would be a substitute for a transfer by the treasuries of the 
member states to the EU budget. It is necessary to make sure that new fiscal 
resources do not increase the overall tax burden on the member states. In 
the case of a new tax, it would be necessary for a member state to reduce 
the tax burden on other items to match the yield of this resource. 
Monitoring compliance would be difficult.  
Fixing tax rates 
Budgetary agreements would become more complex, as the European 
Council and Parliament would not only have to reach an agreement on the 
level of expenditure in the EU, but also on the rate of taxation.  
Administrative burden  
In most cases, the introduction of taxes would increase the administrative 
burden and costs of financing the own resources. Only a tax system based 
on a share of an existing tax can be contemplated. It may be the case that 
the administrative, political and economic costs associated with running a 
tax-based own resources system are too high to make it a worthwhile 
initiative. 
7.4  What system of own resources for the future? 
As mentioned at the start of this section, the current system has certain 
advantages, which should be seriously considered before introducing any 
change, i.e. simplicity and cost effectiveness, long-term stability and 
predictability, a guarantee of budgetary balance and a distribution of the 
burden among member states closely proportional to GNI. Changes in the 
own resources should be undertaken with extreme care to avoid trading off 
these qualities without obvious benefits that work in practice. 
Furthermore, the main problems of the own resources have their 
origin on the expenditure side. As long as member states do not agree on 
the policies and their distributional effects, any own resources system, tax-
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can silence the complaints of net contributors as long as there are disputes 
about the objectives and impact of expenditure policies. Under a tax-based 
system there is even a risk of a greater number of corrections, as countries 
feeling unfairly affected by the taxes may request compensation in one 
form or another. These compensations would not necessarily be restricted 
to excessive net contributors.  
Consequently, the own resources system should be kept simple, even 
if some further limited, fully endorsed and carefully chosen tax-based 
elements may be introduced (such as environmental taxes). If countries 
have reasonable grounds to view their net contribution as excessive, a 
correction could be agreed openly through the expenditure side. This cost 
could be excluded when setting the ceiling of the EU budget expenditures, 
as it would be a de facto rebate. 
The introduction of further fiscal resources, if agreed, should be 
undertaken with great care. In theory, such a system may have many 
advantages from the point of view of accountability and transparency, but 
the practical difficulties – operational and political – are often 
underestimated in the literature. An analysis of the situation leads to the 
following conclusions:  
•  Simplicity and cost-effectiveness argue in favour of an existing tax or 
taxes.  
•  Long-term stability and predictability rule out taxes that may react 
unpredictably to cyclical swings in member states’ economies. 
•  To guarantee that the budget balances, taxes should be stable and 
predictable with the existence of a source of marginal finance such as 
GNI contributions to cover any shortfall.  
It is highly recommended to avoid taxes that do not have a close link 
to national wealth, otherwise ‘correction mechanisms’ would soon likely 
follow, such as further caps in the contributions or rebates, which would 
have to be covered by expansions in the marginal GNI finance. The history 
of the ‘virtual’ VAT contributions is a telling example of the consequences 
of even small deviations from a proportional resource based on GNI. 
A fiscal system could preserve the positive aspects of the present 
system while reinforcing the link with the contributors, strengthening 
accountability and increasing visibility. Yet no single fiscal resource can do 
so alone; hence, a possible solution could be a mix of tax-based resources 
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should be produced by a uniform levy on a statistically harmonised 
existing base or bases. The marginal GNI contribution could be adapted if 
necessary to ensure that the contributions of the member states reflects the 
economic wealth of the member states, i.e. their shares in EU GNI. So GNI 
contributions would be altered to compensate for deviations in the taxes 
from the contributory capacity, in particular for those taxes that do not 
fulfil the regional arbitrariness criteria. The marginal GNI contribution 
would fulfil two necessary requirements. The first is to keep the budget in 
balance and the second is to preserve the proportionality of contributions. 
Such a system would be simple to administer and ensures equitable 
treatment at the member state level. Equity as among citizens would in any 
case depend on the tax mix.  
Still, the basic own resources system is unlikely to change radically in 
the foreseeable future, owing to the small size of the budget and concerns 
over fiscal sovereignty. The small size excludes complex and costly tax 
collection systems, and the need for a balanced budget requires the 
continuation of a GNI-based resource to cover any residual needs. Crucial 
criteria for the resources are sufficiency, predictability and equity, which 
are already features of the present system before any corrections and 
concessions. Improvements in the EU’s public finances are first and most 
importantly to be found on the expenditure side and should be a priority.  
One tax is increasingly presented as the most simple to implement – 
one based on real VAT. A forthcoming CEPS book by Cipriani (2007) 
discusses at length the merits and limitations of the VAT resource, claiming 
that the regressiveness of the tax, although amply discussed, has not 
stopped its wide use in member states. Even the European Parliament does 
not consider this possible regressivity a barrier. A report by the Budget 
Committee calls for the use of existing taxes in the future system of own 
resources, for which a direct VAT contribution is a key candidate 
(European Parliament, 2007).  
It is generally stated that poorer countries have higher consumption 
as a proportion of income, with the effect that the VAT base is relatively 
larger. Gros & Micossi (2005) even dismiss the notion of regressivity in the 
VAT resource, showing that data do not corroborate this position, with 
VAT returns as a share of GDP in rich countries often exceeding those of 
poorer countries (Table 4, p. 11). There is, however, a flaw in the argument, 
as countries do not have the same national VAT rates: for example, 
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question is whether a given percentage of the VAT rate for the EU budget 
represents a larger share of GDP in poorer countries than in richer ones. 
The same data by Gros & Micossi (2005) show that the share of 
private consumption in relation to GDP tends to be higher in poorer 
countries. Taking into account the different VAT rates, the relative 
regressivity of a VAT resource for the EU becomes visible. More 
specifically, 1% of the VAT value tends to lie closer to 0.4% of GDP in the 
poorer member states compared with the richer ones, where it tends to be 
under 0.35%. The exception again is the UK, in which, owing to the 
particularities of its consumer market, a 1% VAT also represents 0.4% of 
GDP. A VAT resource has many desirable features but it would require a 
corrective GNI key as proposed earlier, rebalancing member states’ 
contributions to better reflect member states’ contributory capacities. This 
step would guarantee that the regressivity is accepted. 
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PART III.  D ECISION-MAKING FOR THE 
FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVES 
his part focuses solely on the decision-making mechanism related to 
the approval of the financial perspectives and it does not delve into 
the annual approval of the yearly budgets. These multi-annual 
frameworks were first introduced in 1988 with the aims of providing a 
stable and foreseeable budgetary framework and of avoiding the recurring 
yearly budget disputes that had plagued the European Community.  
8.  Reaching agreement on the multi-annual framework 
Decision-making on the financial perspectives has been mainly under the 
control of the Council once the Commission has presented the proposed 
framework. The European Parliament has not been formally granted a 
strong say in the determination of the resources, because the Parliament 
has no formal power on setting the level of contributions by the member 
states.  
Also, in the decision-making on resources the European Council has 
often overstepped the formal powers it has by introducing policy 
alterations for expenditures that normally require codecision with the 
European Parliament. It is a commonly held view that the existence of 
multi-annual frameworks has reduced the power of the Parliament in the 
budgetary debate.  
The financial perspectives are not a formal part of the Treaty, but an 
agreement regulated by the Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) and are 
based on stability needs that govern the yearly budgetary process (on areas 
not covered by the Treaty) and on the basic rules and procedures of 
decision-making set by the IIA.  
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The decision-making procedure for the financial perspective has 
characteristic features that have caused strains among the institutions, and 
especially between the Council and the Parliament. The relationship 
between the Council and Parliament in the latest financial perspective 
negotiations was set up in the IIA of 1999.22 The European Commission 
prepares the financial perspective and presents it to the two arms of the 
budgetary authority, the Council and European Parliament. While the 
European Parliament can propose amendments to the financial perspective, 
the Council controls the decision-making procedure and has generally not 
paid due attention to positions taken by the European Parliament. In 
theory, the Council decides unanimously only on the resources, over which 
Parliament has no say. As already mentioned, however, the Council has 
overstepped this rule, such as deciding on funding for housing for regional 
policy. 
The negotiations among member states are highly politicised and 
dominated by member states’ net balances and domestic interests, 
presenting for the presidency a real difficulty in incorporating the 
Parliament’s position. This was blatantly clear in the latest negotiations, 
where credible threats by the Parliament of rejecting the financial 
perspective did not affect the Council’s negotiations in a visible fashion. 
The negotiations were already so stalled that the Council was unwilling or 
even unable to take account of the European Parliament’s concerns. It is 
only after a Council decision that the European Parliament has a real 
opportunity to intervene.  
The European Parliament, while acknowledging the merits of the 
multi-annual frameworks, has resented the lack of power in deciding the 
outcome. The Council decisions are usually taken late in the running 
financial perspective period, placing the Parliament in a dilemma. Fighting 
for substantial changes in the budget becomes a near political impossibility, 
as any delay in the final approval of the financial perspective could cause 
problems in starting the programmes in the first year of the programming 
period. For 2000 to 2006, the delays in the budgetary agreement resulted in 
about half of the structural funds for the first year not being committed. To 
                                                 
22 See European Parliament, Council and Commission, Interinstitutional 
Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 
6 May 1999 on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure, 
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avoid the strong potential of decommitments, a large share of the 
uncommitted funds was distributed across the remaining six years. 
The draft Reform Treaty revises the relationship between the Council 
and the European Parliament, but the procedure remains similar, whereby 
the Parliament can only give its consent after the Council has adopted the 
regulation, i.e. reached a decision on the multi-annual financial framework. 
The draft Treaty has integrated the wording of the IIA into the provisions 
(Chapter II, Art. 270(a)).23 
Presently, the European Parliament’s weapon if it finds the financial 
perspective unacceptable is to revert to the annual procedure and invoke 
Art. 272 of the EU Treaty on the maximum rate of increase in the budget. It 
allows the Parliament to set, with a high degree of discretion, the 
expenditures for the year. Under such circumstances, Parliament has a 
wide margin for setting increases based on its interests. Such an action, 
however, is equivalent to a political earthquake and could cause 
considerable strains between the Parliament and the Council. In theory, the 
Council could even disagree with the Parliament’s budgetary demands and 
reject the financing of non-compulsory expenditure, such as for regional 
policy.  
Nevertheless, despite the aforementioned limitations, the European 
Parliament has managed to de facto increase its influence. Using the 
menace of rejection of the budget, it has managed not only to rearrange 
some of the expenditure programmes (on which it should have co-decided 
anyway), but it has also managed to alter the total allocation of funds, 
increasing the contributions of the member states. The latter change was 
not revolutionary, but changing the level of contributions of member states, 
rather than rearranging the funds agreed, is not part of its formal powers. 
                                                 
23 More specifically, the draft Treaty states: “The Council, acting in accordance with 
a special legislative procedure, shall adopt a regulation laying down the 
multiannual financial framework. The Council shall act unanimously after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, which shall be given by a 
majority of its component members.” (See Conference of the Representatives of the 
Member States, Draft Treaty Amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community, CIG 1/1/07, REV 1, Brussels, 5 
October 2007, retrieved from http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ 
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The European Parliament correctly required the inclusion of an 
important change in the new IIA entering into force in 2007,24 eliminating 
the differences in the treatment of compulsory and non-compulsory 
expenditures, thus imposing co-decision on all expenditure items. 
Parliament has also been able to include in the Council Decision on the EU 
budget for the 2007–13 financial perspective that the review clause includes 
the position of the European Parliament in the budgetary debate. 
The situation is unsatisfactory, because Parliament, as a 
representative body elected by European citizens is able to neither set the 
expenditure priorities nor decide on rises in the level of resources. It is 
important that Parliament assumes responsibility for the priorities of the 
EU. For example, Parliament should be required to endorse the 
Commission’s proposal for the financial perspective before the Council 
discusses them. In this way, the European Parliament would have control 
over the contents of the financial perspective and become responsible and 
accountable for the initial budget proposal, which it should be as the 
political body responsible for its implementation. It would become ‘co-
owner’ of the financial perspective and thus an important force to reckon 
with for the Council. The Council would nevertheless retain its power as 
decision-maker, but would be negotiating a financial perspective that is not 
solely an administrative product of the European Commission. The 
Parliament would still be required to approve the budget once the Council 
has reached an agreement. Pressures would be similar as in the last 
agreement.  
Gros & Micossi (2005) propose letting the Council only decide on the 
level of contributions, and for the Parliament to set the expenditure 
priorities, i.e. distribute the money among the headings. This approach is 
difficult to conceive, as member states would not agree to finance a blank 
box.  
                                                 
24 See European Parliament, Council and Commission, Interinstitutional 
Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 
budgetary discipline and sound financial management, OJ C 139/01, 14 June 2007.  
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PART IV. NET BALANCE EFFECTS OF THE 
LATEST BUDGET AGREEMENT 
his final part analyses the impacts of the latest decisions affecting net 
balances and illuminates the dominating role net balances have in 
the decision-making process. The final agreement on the financial 
perspective for 2007–13 reached between the Council and the Parliament is 
quite complex and unfortunately messy, i.e. full of ad hoc financial 
concessions to member states without a strong rationale behind them. 
These include direct top-ups, changes in co-financing rates for the 
structural funds, increased financial allocations to specific regions and the 
possibility to finance housing in the countries and regions under the 
convergence policy. After the forceful intervention by the European 
Parliament, the final agreement reaches 1.048% of EU GNI for commitment 
appropriations compared with the 1.045% of the Council outcome (Table 
16). Obviously, an increase in spending by 0.003% of GNI will not affect the 
EU economy much despite all the deserved credit to the European 
Parliament for achieving this increase. 
For own resources, the final agreement is very complicated. The UK 
maintains the present rebate under the new arrangements outlined in 
section 6.2.The new agreement also reduces the VAT-based contributions 
for all member states, with an additional sweetener for the principal net 
contributors (Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Austria), who get 
even larger ‘discounts’ on VAT contributions. This is equivalent to an 
indirect rebate, shifting some of the costs onto other member states. The 
GNI contribution is the residual after VAT and TOR contributions. The 
VAT cut offered to these net contributors is accordingly financed by all the 
member states. In addition, specific ad hoc provisions have been agreed 
granting reductions in the contributions of the Netherlands and Sweden. 
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Their present reduced contribution to the UK rebate is maintained. (Part II 
of this report presents the results in more detail.) 
Table 16. Commitment appropriations, 2007–13 (€ million, 2004 prices) 
  Commission 
proposal 
Luxembourg 
compromise 
Council 
agreement 
EP  
agreement  
% Change 
to Council 
agreement 
 % Change 
to 
Commission
1a. Competitiveness 
for growth and 
employment  121,687  72,010  72,010  74,098  2.9  -39.11
1b. Cohesion for 
growth and 
employment  336,308  306,508  308,119  308,041  -0.03  -8.4
2. Preservation and 
management of 
natural resources  400,294  377,801  362,105  371,344  -2.55  -7.23
3. Citizenship, 
freedom, security 
and justice  14,724  11,000  10,270  10,770  4.7  -26.8
4. The EU as a global 
player  62,770  50,010  50,010  49,463  -1.09  -21.2
5. Total 
administrative 
expenditure 57,670  50,300  50,300  49800  0.1  -13.6
Total commitment 
appropriations and % †  993,453  867,629  852,814  863,516  1.25  -13.08
† The totals do not incorporate compensation for candidate countries or flexibility reserves, and 
therefore are slightly lower than the total budget. 
Source: European Commission. 
 
9.  The new agreement – Impacts on net balances 
How does the budget agreement affect the net balances of the member 
states and the UK? A model adapted for this purpose estimates the net 
balances in 2013. The 2013 estimates give a snapshot of where we are 
heading, rather than how. Tables 17, 18 and 19 and Figures 8 and 9 present 
the results of the estimations. 
The author’s estimations are based on 2004 expenditures adapted for 
the new budget, such as the sugar policy reform or tariff changes. Some 
calculations are based on the new budget expenditures but are distributed 
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and rural development operations, the author has introduced the 
Commission’s published tables on the allocation for 2013.25 
For own resources, TOR receipts have been reduced in accordance 
with expectations estimated in Kernohan, Núñez Ferrer & Schneider (2005), 
based on probable tariff implications. VAT receipts are reduced in 
proportion to the new VAT call after allowing for its growth in line with 
expected GNI growth. The GNI key contributions have been calculated 
using growth projections based on Commission estimates using the growth 
rates for the own resources report of 2004(b). All have been calculated 
using 2004 prices. 
The results in Table 17 show the net balances in 2013 under three 
scenarios:  
1)  the Commission’s original financial perspective proposal (with the old 
rebate system); 
2)  the agreed budget without any rebates or new concessions; 
3)  the agreed budget under the old own resources system for 
comparison; and  
4)  the budget agreement under the new own resources system outlined 
in the Council’s December 2005 Presidency Conclusions on the 
budget.26 
For the net balances, the changes between the Commission’s 
proposal and the agreed financial framework have been significant. Some 
have to be read with caution. First, the budgetary amounts are very 
different, and estimations on absorption capacity may diverge between the 
author’s calculations and the Commission’s net balance estimations 
(European Commission, 2004b).  
 
                                                 
25 See the document “European Support for Cohesion, 2007–2013”, on the 
Commission’s website (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/ 
documents/multiannual_framework/2007_2013/tab_cohesion_2007-013_en.pdf); 
see also the document “European support for rural development” on the 
Commission’s website (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/ 
documents/multiannual_framework/2007_2013/tab_rural_devt_2007-
2013_en.pdf). 
26 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council 
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Table 17. Net balances in 2013 (€ million) 
   Commission FP 
old own 
resources
New FP no
rebates
New FP old 
own resources
New FP new 
own resources
Belgium 4,954.09 2,726.57 2,432.35 2,450.39
Czech Republic  3,674.72 3,612.72 3,524.93 3,520.24
Denmark -700.53 -608.62 -807.26 -795.29
Germany -14,055.95 -12,010.40 -12,396.68 -11,609.49
Estonia 472.04 628.52 618.04 617.08
Greece   3,830.89 2,771.64 2,572.43 2,603.85
Spain 197.59 1,150.02 248.61 396.40
France -8,302.32 -5,140.57 -6,889.84 -6,624.35
Ireland 808.39 504.40 350.22 372.99
Italy -6,528.05 -3,522.39 -4,894.24 -4,842.71
Cyprus -51.95 63.51 48.76 47.88
Latvia 692.01 876.45 862.05 859.64
Lithuania 1,250.99 1,462.17 1,436.36 1,433.02
Luxembourg 1,745.40 1,315.05 1,291.88 1,295.70
Hungary 3,802.81 4,101.77 4,011.61 4,005.04
Malta 85.47 151.18 146.72 146.66
Netherlands -3,124.18 -2,987.87 -3,071.35 -2,086.13
Austria -628.10 -806.93 -849.72 -817.84
Poland 10,673.04 10,234.01 9,998.27 9,985.61
Portugal 2,374.51 1,893.67 1,750.31 1,781.68
Slovenia 532.20 555.92 525.31 524.20
Slovakia 1,717.05 1,833.73 1,792.32 1,789.43
Finland -508.87 -280.86 -439.68 -427.89
Sweden -1,741.25 -1,610.56 -1,664.18 -1,395.71
UK -7,315.34 -13,087.21 -6,649.65 -9,250.61
Bulgaria 1,472.86 1,167.26 1,138.10 1,131.16
Romania 4,672.46 5,029.83 4,937.33 4,912.04
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The agreement benefits the Netherlands and Sweden substantially. It 
markedly reduces their net balance, complemented by lower VAT 
contributions and additional cuts to their contributions.  
According to the estimations, some EU-15 net beneficiaries are 
significant losers. Spain becomes a net contributor. The final agreement 
nevertheless cushions the fall over the years by reducing more gradually 
the cohesion funds compared with the compromise position by the 
Luxembourg presidency.  
An interesting effect of the entire set of changes, with VAT 
reductions and cuts on contributions, is the overcompensation of Germany 
and the Netherlands for the UK rebate. Under the present resources system 
without the rebate, Germany would have paid net €12,010 million, €384 
million less than the estimated contribution with the UK rebate. Under the 
new proposed resources system, Germany is to contribute €787 million less 
compared with the old own resources system, which is €400 million less 
than in a system without the UK rebate. Similarly, the Netherlands and 
Sweden are overcompensated (see Tables 18 and 19, Figures 8 and 9). 
Table 18. Net balances as a % of GNI, selected net contributors, 2013 
   Previous rebate system Final agreement
Germany -0.48 -0.45
Spain -0.02 -0.04
France -0.33 -0.32
Italy -0.30 -0.30
Netherlands -0.55 -0.37
Austria -0.30 -0.29
Sweden -0.46 -0.39
UK -0.28 -0.39
Source: European Commission and own calculations. 
Table 19. Net balances (€ million) 
Net budgetary balances before any 
rebate, 2013 
  Net budgetary balances 2013, 
based on the new agreement 
Netherlands -2,988  Netherlands  -2,086 
Germany -12,010  Germany  -11,609 
Sweden -1,610  Sweden  -1,395 
Source: Own calculations.  72 | NÚÑEZ FERRER 
 
Figure 8. Net balance comparison under the old and new rebates, 2013 (% of GNI) 
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For Germany, the new 
deal corresponds to 
double its contribution to 
the UK rebate.  
In this result, we see that with the new 
system the UK loses approximately €2.6 
billion (0.11% of GNI) and contributes 
more than under the old rebate system.  
For the Netherlands, the new 
system significantly reduces 
its net contribution to the 
budget. A similar effect is 
seen for Sweden and Austria 
on a smaller scale. 
Spain loses with the new own 
resources system owing to its 
payment to net contributors, 
but in any case the country is 
better off on average over the 
period than under the rejected 
Luxembourg compromise.  
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Figure 9. Net balance comparison, 2013 (€ million) 
-15000
-10000
-5000
0
5000
10000
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
C
z
e
c
h
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
G
r
e
e
c
e
 
S
p
a
i
n
F
r
a
n
c
e
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
I
t
a
l
y
C
y
p
r
u
s
L
a
t
v
i
a
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
M
a
l
t
a
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
P
o
l
a
n
d
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
S
l
o
v
e
n
i
a
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
S
w
e
d
e
n
U
K
B
u
l
g
a
r
i
a
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
Final Agreement old rebate Final agreement new rebate
 
Source: Own calculations.  
The new rebate system primarily benefits the main net payers, with 
other member states having to compensate for their indirect rebates 
and thus gaining no benefit from the change in the UK rebate – some 
are even worse off according to the author’s estimates. 74 | NÚÑEZ FERRER 
 
The Netherlands is clearly receiving a large hidden rebate of its own. 
The net balance under the previous own resources mechanism without the 
UK rebate would have been higher by nearly €900 million for the 
Netherlands. This amount is slightly less than the current contributions 
from customs duties but more than the author’s estimated 2013 TOR 
contributions in 2003.27 This ‘rebate’ is not justifiable even on the grounds 
of excessive contributions from customs duties. The same holds for 
Sweden, with respect to an excess of €200 million (Tables 18 and 19). As 
Figures 8 and 9 show, the impact of the new, reduced UK rebate deal on 
other member states is negligible compared with the old rebate mechanism, 
as these countries have to offset the lower contributions of Germany, the 
Netherlands and Sweden. 
The analysis of the net balances unfortunately shows that budget 
distribution decisions are not only highly dominated by crude net-balance 
considerations, but that the readiness of net contributors to finance the 
policies they have agreed upon is diminishing. In the past, cuts for net 
contributors have usually been limited to reducing their contribution to the 
UK rebate, but now these also reduce their share in financing actual 
policies.  
The real question is if there is any sign of improvement in the 
rationale of the EU budget compared with the previous financial 
perspectives. While overall changes have been small, some decisions 
indicate that a positive shift in direction is taking place on the expenditure 
side. Whether this is going to result in any real improvement on resources 
in the future will depend on the 2008–09 review 
10.  Conclusions on net balances 
The combined effects of tampering with expenditures and own resources to 
adjust net balances are making the budget more complex and opaque. The 
latest decision on the budget shows an increasing unwillingness of the 
wealthier member states to finance EU policies, as demonstrated in the 
rebates and concessions on contributions through VAT and customs duties. 
This reluctance indirectly shifts the financial burden onto poorer member 
states. Some net contributors receive ‘rebates’ that exceed their contribution 
                                                 
27 Contributions in 2004 from customs duties were €1,047 million (European 
Commission data). The estimated total TOR (customs duties plus agricultural and 
sugar levies) was €860 million. THE UK REBATE AND THE CAP – PHASING THEM BOTH OUT? | 75 
 
to the UK rebate. This is a sign that member states do not regard the 
policies as worth financing in full even in the absence of the distorting UK 
rebate. 
The need to ‘fix’ net balances is clearly a limiting factor when 
needing to reorient the EU budget. The relation between contributions in 
proportion to the share of EU GNI and the need to reform expenditures 
ultimately leads either to large inefficiencies in expenditures or to 
significant distortions in the resources system, or to both. 
Without a combined reform of the expenditures and the own 
resources system, the credibility of the budget and its ability to intervene in 
areas of real value for the EU are considerably reduced. The analysis in this 
report draws the conclusion that the improvement in the rationale of 
expenditures and an increase in the quality of interventions should occur in 
tandem with an elimination of distortions in the resources mechanism.   
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APPENDIX 1. FARM HOUSEHOLD INCOMES 
IN OECD COUNTRIES 
ublic income-support policies are usually based on means testing, 
which in general take into account total household income. That is 
not the case for direct agricultural payments in the EU, which 
originate from support targeted at production. If direct payments claim to 
be income support, a level of means testing is necessary given their volume. 
According to the OECD (2003a and 2006), in some countries farm 
household incomes are considerably higher than the national average. It is 
interesting to note is that in most cases where farm household income is the 
highest, the share of non-farm income is low, which calls into question the 
general opinion that financial returns in agriculture are low, but rather that 
the income problem is principally a farm structure issue (Figure A1.1). 
Unfortunately, farm household-income data is out of date, and the OECD 
has not updated this information. On the other hand, the data show that 
the situation in which farm household incomes have comparable wealth to 
the average household is not a new phenomenon. 
Small farms are less prone to disappear than it is commonly believed 
when agricultural support falls, because many farm households have 
diverse sources of income. Data based on farm incomes, which do not 
incorporate additional non-farm incomes, draw a very erroneous picture of 
farmers. Rural depopulation stems from many factors beyond agricultural 
incomes, such as lack of access to services. A look at how important the 
share of non-agricultural incomes is in OECD countries is sufficient to 
realise that farming is by far not the only activity possible in rural areas. In 
the EU, farmers in Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the UK earn a 
higher share of income from non-farm activities; for many countries, the 
share is not much less than 50% (Figure A1.2). 
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Figure A1.1 Total income of farm households as a ratio of all/other households 
 
Note: All households are included except for Japan, for which the data concerns workers’ 
households, and for Korea, for which it concerns urban households. 
Sources: OECD (2003a), calculations are based on national statistics and the Eurostat 
database (Eurostat, 1999 and 2002). 
The farm poverty assumption has also been reinforced by the 
candidate countries and in particular Poland, which insists on the need for 
social support. Yet, according to the World Bank (2001), the average farm 
household income in this country (including income from non-farm 
activities and social benefits) was significantly higher than that of other 
rural, non-farm households – even years before EU accession. Nevertheless, 
this data hides the fact that there is a very strong degree of income 
polarisation in agriculture. Farms with fewer than 7 hectares are very poor 
and derive 80% of their income from the pension system. The viable and 
richer farm households possess more than 15 hectares. Figure A1.2 on 
average incomes also confirms that in Poland, the average income of farm 
households was higher than the national average in 2000, and the CAP has 
substantially increased farm incomes in the new member states, by 50% in THE UK REBATE AND THE CAP – PHASING THEM BOTH OUT? | 83 
 
2004 according to Eurostat data. This rise occurred despite the only partial 
introduction of direct payments. In fact, even with all the reforms, price 
support still accounts for roughly half of support (Wichern, 2004). 
Figure A1.2 Percentage share of farm income in total income of farm households 
 
1) Income from independent activities 
2) Agricultural households in rural areas 
Source: OECD (2003a), calculations based on national statistics and the Eurostat database 
(1999 and 2002). 
Furthermore, statistical data at the regional level in the new member 
states often reveal that poverty among non-farmers is as acute if not worse 
than for the semi-subsistence farmers. For illustration, taking the very rural 
and poor Polish area of Podkarpazkie in 2005 (data from the Statistical 
Office Rzeszow), Figure A1.3 shows that gross incomes are often lower 84 | NÚÑEZ FERRER 
 
than in farming, with farming households earning more than the average. 
Moreover, the discrepancies surrounding the disposable incomes of farms 
are even greater than the data shown, owing to the more beneficial tax and 
social security terms. 
Figure A1.3 Gross income by economic activity in Rzeszow, Poland, 2005 
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Source: Statistical Office Rzeszow (online database). 
The data for gross income distribution are surprising, but the worst 
discrepancies lie within the agricultural sector itself. The higher average 
incomes stem from the exceptionally high receipts of the larger commercial 
farm households. There is no doubt that among the poorest and most 
deprived citizens of the region there are many small and semi-subsistence 
farmers. But these farmers are not yet the target of the bulk of support. 
CAP support is still related to the size of the farms or number of farm 
animals. A clear consequence of this situation is that in most countries the 
farmers who receive the lion’s share of CAP support are on average better 
off than the rest of the population.  
 
|
 
8
5
APPENDIX 2. FINANCIAL ALLOCATION OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
FUNDS BY MEASURE IN 2003 
Table A2.1 Financial allocation of rural development funds (2003) 
Title Measure  Function  EU funds   Total public funds 
    
(Total) 
(% 
Share) (Total) 
(% 
 Share) 
Investment in 
agricultural holdings 
General investments  Sectoral – agriculture  308,008 
 
6.73 
 
936,304 
 
9.23 
 
Setting-up of young 
farmers 
Set-up aid  Sectoral – agriculture   123,466 
 
2.70 
 
262,755 
 
2.59 
 
Training  Vocational training support  Sectoral – agriculture   27,881  0.61  68,657  0.68 
Early retirement  Pension income support  Sectoral – agriculture   69,630  1.52  186,038  1.83 
Compensatory payments for 
LFAs 
Sectoral – agriculture   947,945 
 
20.71 
 
2,344,320 
 
23.11 
 
LFAs and areas with 
environmental 
restrictions  Compensatory payments for 
areas with environmental 
restrictions 
Sectoral – agriculture   3,835 
 
 
0.08 
 
 
7,279 
 
 
0.07 
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Table A2.1, cont. 
Agri-environment   Support for environmentally 
friendly practices and animal 
welfare 
Sectoral – agriculture   1,761,190 
 
 
38.47 
 
 
3,249,440 
 
 
32.03 
 
 
Breeds in danger of 
being lost to farming 
–  Sectoral – agriculture  14,545 
 
0.32 
 
23147 
 
0.23 
 
Improving processing 
and marketing of 
agricultural products 
Investments to improve 
processing and marketing 
channels 
Sectoral – agriculture   247,337 
 
 
 
5.40 
 
 
 
517,992 
 
 
 
5.11 
 
 
 
Forestry Improve  forest  management Territorial  153,087 
 
3.34 
 
379,150 
 
3.74 
 
  Afforestation of agricultural 
land 
Sectoral – agriculture  254,430 
 
 
5.56 
 
 
406,977 
 
 
4.01 
 
 
Promoting adaptation 
and development of 
rural areas 
Land improvement  Sectoral – agriculture  8,043 
 
 
 
0.18 
 
 
 
17,310 
 
 
 
0.17 
 
 
 
  Land re-parcelling  Sectoral – agriculture  93,072 
 
 
2.03 
 
 
232,906 
 
 
2.30 
 
 
  Set-up of farm relief and farm 
management services 
Sectoral – agriculture  5,843 
 
 
0.13 
 
 
13,528 
 
 
0.13 
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Table A2.1, cont. 
  Marketing of quality 
agricultural products 
Sectoral – agriculture  35,667 
 
 
0.78 
 
 
66,818 
 
 
0.66 
 
 
  Basic services for rural 
populations 
Territorial   65,779 
 
 
1.44 
 
 
128,148 
 
 
1.26 
 
 
  Renovation and development 
of villages and protection and 
conservation of the rural 
heritage 
Territorial   95,461 
 
 
 
2.09 
 
 
 
275,565 
 
 
 
2.72 
 
 
 
  Diversification of agricultural 
activities and activities close 
to agriculture to provide 
multiple activities or 
alternative incomes 
Semi-sectoral – close to 
agriculture 
61,591 
 
 
 
 
 
1.35 
 
 
 
 
 
163,262 
 
 
 
 
 
1.61 
 
 
 
 
 
   Agricultural water-resources 
management 
Sectoral – agriculture  74,475 
 
 
1.63 
 
 
245,679 
 
 
2.42 
 
 
  Development and 
improvement of 
infrastructure connected with 
the development of 
agriculture 
Sectoral – agriculture  76,096 
 
 
 
 
1.66 
 
 
 
 
163,923 
 
 
 
 
1.62 
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Table A2.1, cont. 
  Encouragement of tourist and 
craft activities 
Semi-sectoral – close to 
agriculture 
35,176 
 
 
0.77 
 
 
79,826 
 
 
0.79 
 
 
  Protection of the environment 
in connection with 
agriculture, forestry and 
landscape conservation as 
well as with the improvement 
of animal welfare  
Semi-sectoral – 
agriculture 
83,042 
 
 
 
 
 
1.81 
 
 
 
 
 
190,162 
 
 
 
 
 
1.87 
 
 
 
 
 
  Restoring agricultural 
production potential 
damaged by natural disasters 
and introducing appropriate 
prevention instruments 
Sectoral – agriculture  31,603 
 
 
 
 
0.69 
 
 
 
 
185,812 
 
 
 
 
1.83 
 
 
 
 
  Financial engineering  Sectoral – agriculture  1,309 
 
 
0.03 
 
 
805 
 
 
0.01 
 
 
   Total 4,578,008 
 
 
– 
 
 
10,146,307 
 
 
– 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2006). 
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APPENDIX 3. ANALYSIS OF THE GENERALISED 
CORRECTION MECHANISM 
n 2004, the European Commission proposed a possible, constrained 
GCM for the Community’s own resources (European Commission, 
2004b). According to this system, member states whose net contribution 
to the EU budget exceeded a given negative net-balance threshold as a 
percentage of GNI would be eligible for a rebate of 66% of the sum over 
this level. This approach follows the rationale of the system for the UK 
rebate, with the exception that the UK’s threshold is 0%, which makes it 
valid for the whole net contribution. Member states obtaining the rebate 
also have to participate in the reimbursement of the rebate amount. 
The contribution to the rebate by the beneficiaries is necessary to 
avoid an excessive burden for other member states. This means that in 
some very specific cases, a member state benefiting from the constrained 
correction mechanism could end up paying more than it receives.  
The mechanism also introduces further constraints. The volume of 
the rebate could be too large, increasing the burden beyond the costs of the 
UK mechanism. Thus, a maximum available refund volume (MARV) is also 
proposed. If the rebate exceeds this level, the rebate level would be reduced 
accordingly.  
Proposed rebate levels 
The basic rules for the UK rebate are being applied to the categories of 
expenditure and resources that will be used for the rebate calculation. As 
such, the equivalent of the old headings of agriculture, structural 
operations, internal policies and administration are to be used and TORs 
are to be excluded. 
The rebate mechanism proposed attempts to avoid unduly increasing 
the burden on countries that are contributors to the rebate. The selection of 
the negative net-balance GNI threshold and the MARV are decisive 
parameters to ensure this. In general, even if the effects are not completely 
linear for all countries, lower (negative) thresholds for the net balance 
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would grant rebates to more net contributors as well as create a higher 
overall rebate. Higher (negative) thresholds on the other hand reduce the 
rebate volume and the number of beneficiaries.  
With the need to limit the costs of the system, the document proposes 
a threshold of -0.35% of GNI and a MARV of €7.5 billion. This MARV is 
presented by the European Commission as based on the rebate for the UK 
if the present system were maintained for the period 2007–13. The 
difference in respect of the UK rebate is that it now represents the sum of 
the rebates to all beneficiaries and not only the UK. Furthermore, as all 
countries pay for the rebate in proportion to GNI, the actual cost of the 
rebate for the non-beneficiary member states is less than under the 
unchanged UK rebate mechanism. According to the author’s own 
estimations, the actual value of the rebate for the UK would fall 
substantially to approximately €2-2.5 billion compared with the €4-5 billion 
applied in the 2003 budget, but the balance between the net contributors 
and their contributory capacity based on GNI per capita is improved.  
What is interesting to note is that the GCM would cost less to the 
non-beneficiary member states than the present system. This result stems 
from the disappearance of the arbitrarily determined, ad hoc ‘rebates’ from 
which the ‘excessive’ net contributors benefit. These opaque ‘rebates’ have 
increased the contributions for all the other countries substantially.  
Conclusion 
The GCM is an improvement on the UK rebate mechanism and it 
eliminates the distortions caused by the disproportionate rebate level of the 
UK rebate. The new GCM potentially benefits the net beneficiaries 
compared with the contributions under the old and present systems. The 
net contributors from the other side show comparable negative net 
balances as with the old system (they lose their special ad hoc concessions). 
The GCM, however, acts more in line with the Fontainebleau Agreement, 
which is the basis for the UK rebate.  
The financial benefits to the net contributors are not an improvement 
on the present system, which has probably reduced their interest in the 
GCM considerably. The correction mechanism also does not address the 
fundamental problems on the expenditure side, nor does it guarantee that 
the net contributors would not ask for further ‘corrections’.  
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APPENDIX 4. INCOMPATIBILITIES BETWEEN 
CORPORATE TAXATION  
AND A GCM 
iven the small size of the EU budget as a percentage share of the 
EU’s GNI, small deviations in tax revenues among member states 
or slight structural differences in the composition of the economy 
and therefore the size of the sector taxed can have a strong impact on the 
distribution of the contributions. With member states disputing their net 
balances at the level of a fraction of a percentage of GNI, any difference 
among member states has strong repercussions. The GCM may not be able 
to offer an acceptable solution to the net budgetary imbalances if the 
resources have a different cross-country distribution than the GNI.  
A small illustration of the issues raised by the correction of net 
balances caused by the resource distribution is presented in the Table A4.1. 
This illustration shows a union of five countries. Countries A and B are 
identical in GNI and have the same budget receipts from the union. 
Countries C and E are also identical in GNI and have the same budget 
receipts from the union. Country D has a net contribution of 0.  
With a GCM set at a threshold of -0.02% of GNI, under a system of 
resources based on shares of GNI, country pairs A and B, and C and E are 
affected in exactly the same manner, either positively or negatively. Each 
pair of countries shows an identical net contribution at the end of the 
process. Country D sees its net balance deteriorate slightly because of its 
contribution to the rebates. 
In the case in which the resources are levied through a tax that does 
not reflect the correct share of GNI, the outcome can be markedly different.  
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Table A4.1 shows tax incidence deviations of only a fraction of GNI, 
causing markedly different contributions and net balances to the GNI-
based resources for the identical pairs of countries A and B, and countries C 
and E (in GNI terms), while country D is also in a worse position than with 
the GNI-based contributions. Changes in the rates of correction and 
thresholds for triggering the correction mechanism may partially alleviate 
the discrepancies, but the situation is complex. The size of the rebate can 
easily grow large and suffers from large variations with small changes in 
the tax-based contributions of the countries, and the outcome will for some 
countries be worse than under the GNI system and even under the present 
U K  r e b a t e  s y s t e m .  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  c o n c e i v e  a  t a x - p l u s - c o r r e c t i o n  
combination that can be acceptable for the member states. 
In this illustration, the identical countries A and B show not only 
very different net balances, but also one is highly negative, while the other has 
become significantly positive! The correction narrows down the discrepancy 
yet is far from approaching any situation similar to horizontal equity. Less 
extreme, but still strong is the discrepancy between countries C and E. 
Country D shows a very strong negative imbalance, which is partially 
offset by the GCM. Still, the negative net balance of countries A and D is 
considerably worse than with the GNI-based resources. 
Under a system of taxes that does not reflect the GNI shares very 
well, the equity criteria for member states cannot be fulfilled even after the 
introduction of a GCM. Taxes have to reflect very closely the GNI shares of 
the member states or they have to be treated as the present TOR, as 
completely independent resources of the EU not subject to correction. 
The illustration may look too abstract or unrealistic, but such effects 
are to be expected for some taxes. This author has performed simulations 
for the EU-15 using actual corporate tax information, in which this problem 
occurred. The corporate income tax proposed by the Commission is such a 
case. Corporate incomes in the EU have shown distinctly different results 
in the EU. Furthermore, the UK’s corporate sector has been performing 
better over a period well beyond the present seven-year cycle of the 
financial perspectives, which shows an element of structural differences 
among member states. It is inconceivable to have one country continuously 
contributing more under the reasoning that the operations of its 
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Table A4.1 Simplified illustration of a tax effect (based on a budget of €100 million 
and total union GNI of €60 billion) 
 Countries   
 A  B  C  D  E  Total 
GNI 15,000  15,000  12,000  6,000  12,000 60,000 
% Expenditure 
share 
20  20  25  10  25 100 
Budget exp. 
receipts 
120  120  15  15  15 285 
GNI-based resource 
% Share of GNI  25  25  20  10  20 100 
GNI resource  25,000  25,000  20,000  10,000  20,000 100,000 
Expenditures 20,000  20,000  25,000  10,000  25,000 100,000 
Net balance   -5,000  -5,000  5,000  0  5,000 – 
Net balance, % 
GNI 
-0.33  -0.33  0.42  0.00  0.42 – 
Rebate mechanism for GNI-based resource 
Threshold GCM 
0.2 
-0.2  -0.2  –  –  – – 
Excess, % GNI  0.13  0.13  –  –  – – 
Rebate, % GNI 
(correction 0.66) 
-0.09  -0.09  –  –  – – 
Rebate amount  -1,320  -1,320  – –  – -2,640 
Financing the 
rebate 
-660  -660  -528  -264  -528 -2,640 
Net balance after 
correction 
-4,340  -4,340  4,472  -264  4,472 – 
Final NB based 
on GNI 
-0.29  -0.29  0.37  -0.04  0.37 – 
Tax-based resource 
% Tax 
contribution 
30  15  18  14  23 100 94 | NÚÑEZ FERRER 
 
Table A4.1, cont. 
Tax-based 
resource 
30,000  15,000  18,000  14,000  23,000  100,000 
Net balance (tax 
res) 
-10,000  5,000  7,000  -4,000  2,000  0 
Net balance tax-
based resource 
-0.67  0.33  0.58  -0.67  0.17  – 
Rebate mechanism for tax-based resource 
Threshold GCM 
0.2 
-0.2  –  –  -0.2  –  – 
Excess, % GNI  0.47  –  –  0.47  –  – 
Rebate, % GNI 
(correction 0.66) 
0.31  –  –  0.31  –  – 
Rebate amount  4,620  –  –  1848  –  6,468 
Financing the 
rebate 
-1,617  -1,617  -1,293.6  -646.8  -1,293.6  -6,468 
Net balance after 
correction 
-6,997  3,383  5,706.4  -2,798.8  706.4  0 
Final NB based 
on GNI 
-0.47  0.23  0.48  -0.47  0.06  – 
Source: Own data. 
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